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The Antitrust Implications of Filing “Sham” 
Citizen Petitions with the FDA 
Matthew Avery*, William Newsom**, and Brian Hahn*** 
The First Amendment protects the right of all citizens to petition the government. The 
Food and Drug Administration (the “FDA”) has provided a means by which citizens 
or interested entities can voice their concerns to the FDA by filing a so-called “citizen 
petition.” However, some brand-name pharmaceutical companies have abused this 
process by filing baseless petitions with the FDA in an effort to delay generic 
competition. Such anticompetitive activity is generally protected by the Noerr-
Pennington doctrine, which grants antitrust immunity to activity that involves 
petitioning the government for redress. However, the immunity does not apply to 
“sham” petitions, the main objective of which is to cause anticompetitive harm through 
the process, rather than the outcome, of a petition. The citizen petition process has 
provided a number of examples of likely sham petitions, resulting in delayed generic 
entry into the market. In some cases, such delay has resulted in billions of dollars in 
extra profits for brand-name manufacturers submitting “sham” petitions, at the expense 
of consumers and generic manufacturers. 
 
This Article analyzes recent cases in which plaintiffs allege that the citizen petitions aim 
to delay generic entry, and suggests precautions that practitioners can take in such 
lawsuits. It proposes a variety of changes to FDA regulations, as well as additions to 
judicial doctrines, to curb the problems caused by sham petitions. It also serves as a 
guide to brand-name manufacturers who wish to avoid liability under the “sham” 
exception. These proposals may become more relevant as the rate of filing citizen 
petitions grows and more generic drug applications accrue in the FDA’s backlog. 
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FDA has a commonsense policy to allow ordinary citizens or medical 
experts to submit petitions to the agency about drugs that it is 
considering approving. This procedure should be used to protect public 
health—but too often, it is subverted by those who seek only to delay 
the entry onto the market of generic drugs. 
—Senator Edward M. Kennedy1 
Introduction 
The next few years will be uniquely challenging for the 
pharmaceutical industry. For more than a decade, the number of new drug 
approvals issued by the Food and Drug Administration (the “FDA” or 
“Agency”) has steadily declined,2 while the cost of research and 
development continues to rise.3 Compounding this problem is a rapidly 
approaching “patent cliff.”4 Between 2009 and 2014, over forty of the 
most popular brand-name drugs are scheduled to lose patent protection, 
including at least nine of the top fifteen best selling drugs in the world.5 
And generic companies continue to file hundreds of applications each 
year to market generic versions of brand-name drugs; the FDA approved 
 
 1. Press Release, Edward M. Kennedy, Statement of Senator Edward M. Kennedy on the 
Passage of the Food and Drug Amendments Act of 2007 (Sept. 21, 2009), available at 
http://www.help.senate.gov/newsroom/press/release/?id=d04cfc73-1449-4ec8-82d0-5de3f0ed4287. 
 2. See Matthew Avery, Personalized Medicine and Rescuing “Unsafe” Drugs with 
Pharmacogenomics: A Regulatory Perspective, 65 Food & Drug L.J. 37, 38 (2010); Matthew Arnold, 
FDA BLA Approvals Rose in 2009 While NMEs Stumbled, Med. Marketing & Media (Dec. 31, 2009), 
http://www.mmm-online.com/fda-bla-approvals-rose-in-2009-while-nmes-stumbled/article/160496. In 
1996, the FDA approved fifty-three new drugs, but in 2011, the FDA only approved thirty new drugs. 
See Anna Edney, Drug Approvals Hit a Seven-Year High in 2011 on Improved Data, Bloomberg (Jan. 
5, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-01-05/drug-approvals-in-u-s-reached-a-seven-year-
high-in-2011-on-improved-data.html. 
 3. See Burrill & Co., Biotech 2008 Life Sciences: A 20/20 Vision to 2020 43 (2008); Pills Get 
Smart: Potential Encapsulated, The Economist, Jan. 2010, at 78. Over the same period, research and 
development spending by pharmaceutical manufacturers has increased 187%, from $16.9 billion to 
$67.4 billion. See Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am., Pharmaceutical Industry Profile 2011. 
 4. Christopher K. Hepp, Big Pharma Gearing up to Face the Patent Cliff, Phila. Inquirer (Nov. 
12, 2010), available at http://www.philly.com/inquirer/business/107412428.html; see More Than 1,000 
Drug Patents Expiring During the Next Two Years, Med. Device & Diagnostic Indus. (Dec. 3, 2010), 
www.mddionline.com/blog/devicetalk/more-1000-drug-patents-expiring-during-next-two-years-
pharmalive-special-report. 
 5. See Kathy Method, Going, Going, Gone, Modern Med. (Aug. 10, 2009), 
http://drugtopics.modernmedicine.com/news/going-going-gone (listing brand-name drugs expiring 
between 2009 and 2012); Tom Randall, Drugmakers Poised to Report Biggest Drop Since 2006 on 
Record Patent Loss, Bloomberg (Apr. 15, 2011), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-04-
15/drugmakers-poised-to-report-biggest-drop-since-2006-on-record-patent-loss.html. Between 2007 
and 2010, more than seventy drugs were scheduled to go off patent. See David Collis & Troy Smith, 
Strategy in the Twenty-First Century Pharmaceutical Industry: Merck & Co. and Pfizer Inc., Harvard 
Bus. Sch., Nov. 2007, at 5. One group reported that nine of the top ten biggest drugs in the world will 
lose patent protection by 2014. See Hepp, supra note 4. 
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476 such applications in 2012.6 In 2013 and beyond, $125 billion in brand-
name drug sales may become exposed to generic competition.7 
Once a pharmaceutical product loses patent protection, competitors 
almost always introduce generic versions of the drug as quickly as 
possible.8 Generic drugs can capture eighty to ninety percent of the market 
within months of entering the marketplace.9 In response to this intense 
generic competition, patent holders have used a variety of controversial 
means to effectively extend their patent-granted monopoly.10 While it is 
important that pharmaceutical pioneers have financial incentives to 
continue developing life-saving drugs,11 indefinite monopoly profits come 
at the expense of consumers. Thus, actions by patent holders that seek to 
extend market exclusivity should be closely examined for impropriety. 
One example of such impropriety arises when pharmaceutical patent 
holders file citizen petitions with the FDA to delay approval of generic 
versions of the pioneer’s drug.12 The citizen petition process was designed 
 
 6. Sohini Das, Gujarat Pharma Firms Lag Behind Industry Majors in USFDA Approvals, Bus. 
Standard (Jan. 31, 2013), http://www.business-standard.com/article/companies/gujarat-pharma-firms-
lag-behind-industry-majors-in-usfda-approvals-113013100009_1.html (reporting 476 total applications 
approved in 2012, an increase from 431 in 2011). 
 7. See Lynne Taylor, Indian Drug Majors: “20%+ Growth in 2013, Driven by Exports”, 
PharmaTimes (Feb. 5, 2013), http://www.pharmatimes.com/Article/13-02-05/ 
Indian_drug_majors_20_growth_in_2013_driven_by_exports.aspx (predicting that “[t]he U.S. generic 
market . . . could grow at an annual average rate of around 8%–9% in the medium term, due to patent 
expiries—set to be worth around $125 billion during 201315”). 
 8. See Cong. Budget Office, How Increased Competition from Generic Drugs Has 
Affected Prices and Returns in the Pharmaceutical Industry 37 n.2 (July 1998) (reporting that 
ninety-five percent of off-patent drugs had generic equivalents in 1994). 
 9. For example, the generic form of Prozac (fluoxetine) claimed approximately 65% of the market 
within a month of generic entry, 80% by the end of the first generic competitor’s 180-day exclusivity 
period, and leveled out at almost 90% after a year of generic competition. See Benjamin G. Druss et al., 
Listening to Generic Prozac: Winners, Losers, and Sideliners, 23 Health Affairs 210, 214 (2004). 
 10. Saami Zain, Sword or Shield? An Overview and Competitive Analysis of the Marketing of 
“Authorized Generics”, 62 Food & Drug L.J. 739, 742 (2007) (“Recently, under the rubric of ‘Lifecycle 
Management,’ consultants and pharmaceutical executives have been encouraging various actions to 
squeeze the most profitability from existing drugs. Certain of these actions have been criticized as 
unethical, anticompetitive or even fraudulent.”); Matthew Avery, Note, Continuing Abuse of the 
Hatch-Waxman Act by Pharmaceutical Patent Holders and the Failure of the 2003 Amendments, 
60 Hastings L.J. 171, 179–83 (2008). 
 11.  Carmelo Giaccotto et al., Drug Prices and Research and Development Investment Behavior in 
the Pharmaceutical Industry, 48 J.L. & Econ. 195, 195 (2005) (reporting a positive correlation between 
profits and research spending). Note that the standard patent term is twenty years from the date when 
the patent application was filed. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2011). But because of the lengthy regulatory 
process, the average pioneer drug enjoys only eleven to twelve years of patent protection after FDA 
approval. See Paying Off Generics to Prevent Competition with Brand Name Drugs: Should It Be 
Prohibited?: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 151–52 (1st Sess. 2007) 
(statement of Billy Tauzin, President & CEO, PhRMA). 
 12. See In re Flonase Antitrust Litig., 284 F.R.D. 207, 211–12 (E.D. Pa. 2012). A citizen petition is 
a petition that any person may submit to the FDA to request the FDA Commissioner to “issue, 
amend, or revoke” a regulation or order, or to request the Commissioner to “take or refrain from 
taking any other form of administrative action.” 21 C.F.R. § 10.30 (2013). 
3. Avery_23 (Do Not Delete) 12/2/2013 1:18 PM 
December 2013]       SHAM CITIZEN PETITIONS 117 
to enable an individual to voice concerns about the safety or efficacy of a 
drug or medical device. In practice, however, it has become another tool 
for pioneers to improperly thwart generic competition.13 Rather than 
voicing legitimate concerns about unsafe drugs, pioneers have used the 
process to forestall FDA approval of generic challengers. 
For example, GlaxoSmithKline allegedly used the citizen petition 
process to delay FDA approval of a generic version of its blockbuster 
drug Flonase (fluticasone propionate nasal spray) by raising safety 
questions about its own drug.14 Although generic competitors had 
developed a nasal-spray delivery mechanism identical to the original 
Flonase package, GlaxoSmithKline altered the specifications of its own 
delivery system and then petitioned the FDA to withhold generic approval 
until the generic challengers could meet the more exacting standards that 
GlaxoSmithKline had just devised.15 A generic challenger and two classes 
of purchasers of Flonase filed an antitrust suit against GlaxoSmithKline, 
asserting that the company improperly used the citizen petition process 
to delay generic entry.16 
However, proving that a citizen petition violates antitrust laws is no 
easy task. As a general rule, efforts by individuals or groups to petition the 
government are immune from antitrust liability under the Noerr-
Pennington doctrine—such petitions are not illegal even if undertaken for 
anticompetitive purposes.17 But the Noerr-Pennington doctrine does not 
apply to attempts to influence government action when the conduct is a 
“mere sham” covering what is actually harassment of a competitor.18 For 
a petition to be considered a “sham,” it must be both objectively baseless 
and improperly motivated.19 A lawsuit may only be considered a sham if 
the filer is attempting to use the government process itself—as opposed 
to the outcome of that process—as an anticompetitive weapon.20 This can 
be the case with citizen petitions if the petition was intended for 
anticompetitive purposes and lacked a reasonable scientific basis.21 The 
 
 13. See In re Flonase Antitrust Litig., 795 F. Supp. 2d 300, 305–08 (E.D. Pa. 2011); Graceway 
Pharm. L.L.C. v. Sebelius, 783 F. Supp. 2d 104, 108 (D.D.C. 2011); Hill Dermaceuticals, Inc. v. U.S. 
Food & Drug Admin., 524 F. Supp. 2d 5, 7 (D.D.C. 2007). 
 14. In re Flonase, 795 F. Supp. 2d at 301–02. 
 15. See id. at 307–08. 
 16. Id. at 301. 
 17. See E. R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 139–40 (1961) 
(“Noerr”); United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 678 (1965) (“Pennington”). 
 18. Noerr, 365 U.S. at 144. 
 19. Prof’l Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 508 U.S. 49, 60–61 (1993). 
 20. Id. at 61; see City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Adver., Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 380 (1991) (“A 
classic example is the filing of frivolous objections to the license application of a competitor, with no 
expectation of achieving denial of the license but simply in order to impose expense and delay.”). 
 21. Professional Real Estate initially described the types of activity regarded as a sham as 
“‘repetitive lawsuits carrying the hallmark of insubstantial claims.’” 508 U.S. at 58 (quoting Otter Tail 
Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 380 (1973)) (first emphasis added). This scope of the sham 
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intended anticompetitive effect of such petitions is to delay generic entry 
beyond the expiration of a patent, effectively extending the pioneer’s 
patent monopoly while the petition is pending.22 
This Article analyzes how the citizen petition process can be used as 
an anticompetitive weapon, especially by brand-name drug manufacturers 
seeking to hinder generic competition. Part I provides a brief overview of 
the regulatory process for generic drugs, particularly the Hatch-Waxman 
Act and the Paragraph IV certification process. Part II explains the citizen 
petition process, including its regulatory background, practical application, 
and recent developments. Part II also describes, by way of example, 
various ways in which the citizen petition process can be abused for 
anticompetitive purposes. Part III reviews the Noerr-Pennington doctrine 
and describes the application of antitrust law to the abuse of the citizen 
petition process. Part IV reviews recent antitrust cases that challenge the 
use of citizen petitions by pharmaceutical patent holders. Part V provides 
strategic considerations for practitioners who are considering using citizen 
petitions during the Hatch-Waxman process. Finally, Part VI proposes 
modifying the current regulatory regime to resolve problems with the 
citizen petition process.23 
 
exception was later interpreted by Louisiana Wholesale Drug Co. v. Sanofi-Aventis to extend to the 
petition process beyond the litigation context laid out in Professional Real Estate. La. Wholesale Drug 
v. Sanofi-Aventis, No. 07 Civ. 7343(HB), 2009 WL 2708110, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 28, 2009) (“In 
[Professional Real Estate], the Supreme Court articulated the two-step inquiry that applies to claims of 
‘sham’ petitioning or litigation.”). 
 22. See, e.g., In re Flonase Antitrust Litig., 795 F. Supp. 2d 300, 304 (E.D. Pa. 2011). 
 23. This Article does not address the following issues: (1) citizen petitions in response to new 
drug applications (“NDAs”), (2) the antitrust implications of reverse payment settlements or 
authorized generics, and (3) anti-SLAPP lawsuits in response to antitrust challenges to citizen 
petitions. For a brief discussion of the use of citizen petitions in response to NDA filings, see infra note 
62. For a discussion of the antitrust implications of reverse payments, see generally William J. 
Newsom, Exceeding the Scope of the Patent: Solving the Reverse Payment Settlement Problem Through 
Antitrust Enforcement and Regulatory Reform, 1 Hastings Sci. & Tech. L.J. 201 (2009). For a 
discussion of the antitrust implications of using authorized generics, see generally Fed. Trade Comm’n, 
Authorized Generic Drugs: Short-Term Effects and Long-Term Impact 2011. The Supreme Court 
recently held that reverse payment settlement agreements may be antitrust violations subject to a 
“rule of reason” analysis. FTC v. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2236 (2013). The Court rejected both the 
traditional scope-of-the-patent test, which made most reverse payment settlement agreements 
presumptively lawful and the FTC’s proposal to make such settlements presumptively unlawful. Id. at 
2237. Instead, the Court took the middle ground and held that courts reviewing such agreements 
should apply the rule-of-reason analysis but left it to the lower courts to figure out what types of 
settlements would actually be antitrust violations. Id. Regarding anti-SLAPP lawsuits in the citizen 
petition context, a citizen petition is a lawful exercise of public participation in an agency decision, and 
an antitrust suit to enjoin such a petition could be seen as stifling public participation, and can thus be 
susceptible to an anti-SLAPP challenge. See, e.g., Cal. Civ. Code § 425.16 (West 2013) (protecting a 
person who has engaged in constitutionally protected activity from “SLAPP” lawsuits). See generally 
Flatley v. Mauro, 39 Cal. 4th 299 (2006) (holding that anti-SLAPP protection does not apply to speech 
and petitioning activity that is illegal as a matter of law and is therefore not constitutionally protected). 
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I.  The Hatch-Waxman Act and Paragraph IV Certifications 
The marketing of generic drugs is regulated by the Hatch-Waxman 
Act.24 Under Hatch-Waxman, before a generic drug manufacturer can 
enter the market, it must seek regulatory approval from the FDA by 
filing an Abbreviated New Drug Application (“ANDA”).25 A 
pharmaceutical company must list all patents that claim its brand-name 
drug in the FDA’s so-called Orange Book.26 As part of the ANDA, the 
generic applicant must make one of the following certifications regarding 
each patent listed in the Orange Book that claims the drug it seeks to 
copy: (I) that the drug is not patented or that patent information has not 
been filed; (II) that the patent has expired; (III) that the generic drug will 
not enter the market until the patent expires; or (IV) that the patent is 
invalid or will not be infringed by the manufacture, use, or sale of the 
generic drug for which the application is submitted.27 These are 
commonly called Paragraph I, II, III, and IV certifications, respectively. 
By making a Paragraph IV certification, a generic manufacturer can 
seek FDA approval to market a generic equivalent of a pioneer’s patented 
drug before the patent term has expired.28 However, subsection 271(e) of 
the Patent Act provides that making a Paragraph IV certification alone is 
an act of patent infringement.29 Consequently, the mere filing of an ANDA 
with a Paragraph IV certification allows the pioneer to sue the generic 
 
 24. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 
98 Stat. 1585 (1984) (the “Hatch-Waxman Act” or “Hatch-Waxman”) (codified as amended at 21 
U.S.C. § 355(j) (2006); 35 U.S.C. §§ 156, 271(e) (2006)). 
 25. H.R. Rep. No. 98-857(1), at 16 (1984). As can be expected, the number of ANDAs submitted 
to the FDA has increased and created a backlog of pending ANDAs. See Kurt R. Karst, OGD 
Finished 2010 on a High Note—Really High!, FDA Law Blog (Feb. 3, 2011, 2:01 PM), 
http://www.fdalawblog.net/fda_law_blog_hyman_phelps/2011/02/ogd-finished-2010-on-a-high-note-
really-high.html; Kurt R. Karst, OGD’s ANDA Backlog and Median ANDA Approval Times are Up—
WAY UP!, FDA Law Blog (Feb. 25, 2010, 12:23 PM), http://www.fdalawblog.net/ 
fda_law_blog_hyman_phelps/2010/02/ogds-anda-backlog-and-median-anda-approval-times-are-up-
way-up-the-solution-lies-in-resources-says-f.html. 
 26. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1) (2011). The Orange Book is the common name for the FDA 
publication Approved Drug Products with Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluations, which is published 
monthly. Office of Generic Drugs, FDA, Approved Drug Products with Therapeutic 
Equivalence Evaluations (2008) [hereinafter Orange Book]. 
 27. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(I)–(IV). 
 28. Consequently, patent challenges pursuant to Paragraph IV are a frequently deployed 
mechanism for the early introduction of generic competition. See Fed. Trade Comm’n, Generic Drug 
Entry Prior to Patent Expiration: An FTC Study 10 (2002) (reporting challenges involving 130 
drugs between 1984 and 2001); Examining the Senate and House Versions of the “Greater Access to 
Affordable Pharmaceuticals Act”: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 113, 117 
(1st Sess. 2003) (statement of Timothy Muris, Chairman, FTC) (noting challenges involving more than 
eighty drugs between January 2001 and June 2003). 
 29. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2)(A) (2011) (“It shall be an act of infringement to submit . . . an [ANDA] 
for a drug claimed in a patent or the use of which is claimed in a patent.”). 
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challenger for infringing its Orange Book-listed patents, which is 
typically what happens.30 
As an incentive for generic manufacturers to risk ANDA litigation, 
the Hatch-Waxman Act provides a 180-day exclusivity period to the first 
generic manufacturer to file an ANDA containing a Paragraph IV 
certification for a particular drug.31 The FDA cannot approve later-filed 
ANDAs for the same drug until 180 days after the first filer begins 
commercially marketing a generic equivalent of the drug.32 As a result, 
the first filer’s product will be the only generic equivalent on the market 
during this period. This exclusivity period is very valuable to generic 
manufacturers,33 as they can sell their product at a price significantly 
higher than they could if multiple generics were on the market.34 
However, the 180-day exclusivity can also work to the advantage of the 
pioneer because if the pioneer can delay or prevent approval of the first 
filer, it delays generic entry entirely. 
II.  The Use and Abuse of Citizen Petitions 
The First Amendment of the Constitution guarantees individuals 
the right to petition the government.35 The right to petition ensures that 
people may freely complain to the government or seek its assistance.36 
Drawing on this right, the Administrative Procedure Act allows any 
“interested person” to petition federal agencies regarding the adoption, 
 
 30. For more discussion of Paragraph IV challenges, see Avery, supra note 10, at 175–82. The 
Hatch-Waxman Act requires all Paragraph IV ANDA applicants to provide notice of the application 
to the challenged NDA and patent holder, including a detailed factual and legal analysis explaining 
why the patent is either invalid or not infringed. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(B). After receiving such notice, 
the NDA holder has forty-five days to bring an infringement action against the ANDA applicant. Id. If 
suit is not filed within that time, the ANDA can be approved immediately. Id. But if suit is brought 
during that time, then the FDA is barred from approving the ANDA for thirty months. Id. During this 
thirty-month stay, the FDA can only grant “tentative approval” of the ANDA, such that it can become 
effective immediately upon expiration of the stay. Id. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv)(II)(dd). 
 31. Until the 180-day exclusivity period has run, the FDA may not approve any successive 
ANDA applications on the same patent. See id. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv). 
 32. Id. 
 33. See Leila Abboud, Drug Makers Use New Tactic to Ding Generics, Wall St. J., Jan. 27, 2004, 
at B1 (“In 2002, when Barr successfully challenged the patent protection on Eli Lilly & Co.’s big 
antidepressant Prozac, Barr got revenue of about $368 million from the new drug, or 31% of its total 
for the year.”). 
 34. For example, when generic Prozac (Fluoxetine) entered the market, the first generic 
challenger sold it at $1.91 per capsule, or twelve percent below the cost of brand-name Prozac. Two 
months after the exclusivity period expired, multiple generics had entered the market and the price of 
generic Prozac had dropped to $0.32 per capsule. Benjamin G. Druss et al., Listening To Generic 
Prozac: Winners, Losers, and Sideliners, 23 Health Affairs 210, 213–14 (2004). 
 35. U.S. Const. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging . . . the right of the 
people . . . to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.”). 
 36. See Robert A. Zauzmer, The Misapplication of the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine in Non-
Antitrust Right to Petition Cases, 36 Stan. L. Rev. 1243, 1244 (1984). One may not automatically 
escape all punishment if the petitioning comprises illegal acts. Id. 
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alteration, or rejection of the agency’s rules.37 Consistent with the 
Administrative Procedure Act, the FDA has adopted regulations allowing 
for so-called citizen petitions, which permit individuals to influence the 
Agency’s regulations on health and safety.38 Citizen petitions allow anyone 
to file a petition with the FDA regarding the Agency’s rulemaking 
activities or, more importantly, its administrative actions.39 
Individuals have used the citizen petition process to lobby the FDA 
on a variety of health and safety issues.40 However, brand-name 
manufacturers have wielded citizen petitions in an attempt to manipulate 
the FDA’s approval of generic drug applications. Some brand-name 
manufacturers have responded to ANDAs by filing citizen petitions that 
question the FDA’s safety, efficacy, and bioequivalence standards for 
approving generic drugs.41 Generic manufacturers sometimes respond 
with their own citizen petitions, which typically object to the strict 
requirements proposed by brand-name manufacturers.42 These generic 
companies have also responded with lawsuits alleging that the pioneers 
violated antitrust and unfair competition laws by filing baseless and 
frivolous citizen petitions.43 In their defense, brand-name companies have 
argued that they are merely taking advantage of their constitutional 
rights, and that the citizen petitions were properly filed according to 
 
 37. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553(e) (2012). 
 38. 21 C.F.R. § 10.30(b) (2013) (“A [citizen] petition (including any attachments) must be 
submitted in accordance with § 10.20 and in the following form”). 
 39. 21 U.S.C. § 355(q) (2011); 21 C.F.R. §§ 10.20, 10.25, 10.30. As applied to the FDA, the right to 
petition guarantees citizens the right to ask the agency to “issue, amend, or revoke” a regulation or 
order. 21 C.F.R. § 10.30(b). Such a petition must be submitted to the FDA before any legal suit can be 
filed to complain about an action or failure to act. Id. § 10.45. Regulations that specifically applied to 
citizen petitions related to ANDAs were codified by the Food and Drug Administration Amendments 
Act of 2007. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(q); Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007, Pub. L. 
No. 110-85, 121 Stat. 823 (2007) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.). Non-citizens 
may also file citizen petitions. 21 C.F.R. § 10.30(a). 
 40. See Finance Senators Urge FDA To Respond To Its Citizen Petition Process, Vaccine Injury 
Help Center (May 31, 2011), http://www.vaccineinjuryhelpcenter.com/finance-senators-urge-fda-to-
respond-to-its-citizen-petition-process; see also Memorandum from June Gibbs Brown, Dep’t of 
Health & Human Servs., Review of the Food and Drug Administration’s Citizen Petition Process, at 1 
(July 17, 1998) (reviewing the FDA’s effectiveness in handling citizen petitions). 
 41. See, e.g., In re Flonase Antitrust Litig., 795 F. Supp. 2d 300 (E.D. Pa. 2011) (addressing a 
brand-name manufacturer that filed citizen petitions requesting that FDA finalize guidelines and 
impose more stringent testing standards before approving any ANDAs); La. Wholesale Drug Co. v. 
Sanofi-Aventis, No. 07 Civ. 7343(HB), 2009 WL 2708110 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 28, 2009) (involving a brand-
name manufacturer that filed citizen petitions requesting that FDA not approve any ANDA filed for 
the generic version unless the ANDA had data from certain bioequivalence studies). 
 42. Justina A. Molzon, The Generic Drug Approval Process, 5 J. Pharmacy & L. 275, 281 (1996). 
 43. See, e.g., In re Flonase, 795 F. Supp. 2d at 30001, 309; La. Wholesale Drug, 2009 WL 2708110, 
at *2. In addition to federal statutes, some generic companies have tried to use state unfair 
competition laws against citizen petition filers. See, e.g., Am. Home Products Corp. v. Johnson & 
Johnson, Nos. 94-1209, 94-1210, 1995 WL 387901 (Fed. Cir. June 29, 1995). 
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FDA law and regulations.44 Understanding the procedure and application 
of a citizen petition is vital to understanding the struggle between brand-
name and generic manufacturers vying for market power. 
A. The Citizen Petition Process 
Any person or corporation may submit a citizen petition to the 
FDA.45 A citizen petition may request that the Agency “issue, amend, or 
revoke” a regulation or order, or that the Agency take or not take a 
particular action.46 The citizen petition must specify the action requested, 
an explanation of the factual and legal basis for the request, and, if 
appropriate, a statement regarding the environmental and economic 
impact of the requested action.47 The petition must also include a 
certification stating that it contains all relevant information, including any 
that may be unfavorable to the petition.48 
Upon receipt, the FDA categorizes citizen petitions into those that 
raise scientific issues and those that raise legal issues.49 Petitions raising 
scientific issues typically focus on the validity of bioequivalence testing 
methods.50 Citizen petitions that focus on legal issues typically raise 
concerns regarding the ANDA approval process itself, the fundamental 
requirements for a generic drug, the patent certifications required by an 
ANDA applicant, and marketing exclusivity issues.51 
The FDA is required to provide a response to a citizen petition 
within a statutorily specified timeframe—previously 180 days, now 150 
days, as of October 2012.52 However, this first response need not 
 
 44. See, e.g., La. Wholesale Drug, 2009 WL 2708110, at *2; In re Flonase, 795 F. Supp. 2d at 300–
01, 309. 
 45. 21 C.F.R. § 10.30(a) (2013). 
 46. Id. § 10.30(b); see 21 U.S.C. § 355(q) (2011). 
 47. 21 C.F.R. § 10.30(b). 
 48. Id.; see Stacey B. Lee, Is A Cure on the Way? The Bad Medicine of Generics, Citizen Petitions, 
and Noerr-Pennington Immunity, 20 Kan. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 98, 110 (2010) (describing the scope and 
content of citizen petitions). 
 49. Molzon, supra note 42, at 281. 
 50. Id. According to the FDA, “[a] generic drug is identical—or bioequivalent—to a brand name drug 
in dosage form, safety, strength, route of administration, quality, performance characteristics and intended 
use. Although generic drugs are chemically identical to their branded counterparts, they are typically sold at 
substantial discounts from the branded price.” Generic Drugs: Questions and Answers, FDA, 
http://www.fda.gov/drugs/resourcesforyou/consumers/questionsanswers/ucm100100.htm (last visited Oct. 31, 
2013). “A [generic] drug shall be considered to be bioequivalent to a listed drug if—(i) the rate and extent of 
absorption of the drug do not show a significant difference from the rate and extent of absorption of the 
listed drug when administered at the same molar dose of the therapeutic ingredient under similar 
experimental conditions in either a single dose or multiple doses.” 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(8)(B)(i). 
 51. Molzon, supra note 42, at 281. 
 52. 21 C.F.R. § 10.30(e)(2) (requiring the FDA to respond within 180 days, except as provided in 
21 C.F.R. § 10.30(e)(4)). This, however, was not always the case. See Lee, supra note 48, at 110, 112; 
see infra notes 72–73 (listing authority for reducing the time limit to 150 days). 
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necessarily address the substance of the petition.53 In response, the FDA 
could (1) deny the petition outright; (2) grant the petition, in whole or in 
part, and take action as requested; (3) provide a tentative response 
requesting more information; or (4) modify the suggested action, postpone 
action, or take other delaying tactics.54 If the petition is denied, it is 
unlikely to receive judicial review because the FDA’s refusal to grant the 
requested relief is within its discretion to choose which issues to pursue.55 
Federal courts have held that the FDA has broad discretion over both the 
regulatory process and the scientific methodology the Agency uses for 
approving generic drugs.56 
Generally, FDA prioritizes responses to petitions by considering 
available resources for the category of subject matter, overall work of the 
agency, and statutory time requirements.57 Despite the statutorily imposed 
180-day response requirement, the FDA has often failed to meet that 
deadline.58 For example, in 2008 the Agency’s average response time was 
226 days, with nearly seventeen percent exceeding the 180-day deadline.59 
These lengthy response times are attributed, in part, to a sharp increase in 
 
 53. 21 C.F.R. § 10.30(e)(2). The response will either: approve the petition, deny the petition, or 
provide a tentative response indicating why the FDA was unable to reach a decision, for example, 
because of other priorities or need for more information. The tentative response may also indicate a 
likely final response and when it may furnish a final response. 
 54. Id. § 10.30(e); Frederick K. Grittner, Citizen Petition, 3 West’s Fed. Admin. Prac. § 3833 
(2011); Lee, supra note 48, at 111. 
 55. Grittner, supra note 54, § 3833; Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 842 (1985) (suggesting that 
the FDA’s discretion applies to at least legal challenges in petitions because “the [Federal Food, Drug, 
and Cosmetic Act] is not a mandatory statute that requires the FDA to prosecute all violations of the 
Act. Thus, the FDA clearly has significant discretion to choose which alleged violations of the Act to 
prosecute. . . . [T]he basis on which the agency chose to exercise this discretion—that other problems 
were viewed as more pressing—generally will be enough to pass muster”). 
 56. See Schering Corp. v. FDA, 51 F.3d 390, 398 (3d Cir. 1995) (“[21 U.S.C. § 355(j)] vests the 
FDA with discretion to determine whether in vitro or in vivo bioequivalence studies, or both, will be 
required for the approval of generic drugs under the abbreviated application process.”), cert. denied 
116 S. Ct. 274 (1995); Schering Corp. v. Sullivan, 782 F. Supp. 645, 651 (D.D.C. 1992) (“Congress did 
not intend to restrict the FDA’s discretion to determine how the bioequivalence requirement is to be 
met.”), vacated as moot, sub nom., Schering Corp. v. Shalala, 995 F.2d 1103, 1105 (D.C. Cir. 1993); 
Fisons Corp. v. Shalala, 860 F. Supp. 859, 865 (D.D.C. 1994). 
 57. See 21 C.F.R. § 10.30(e)(1). 
 58. Id. § 10.30(e)(2); Grittner, supra note 54, § 3833; see Lee, supra note 48, at 110; Brown, supra 
note 40, at 3; Karst, OGD’s ANDA Backlog, supra note 25. 
 59. See FDA Citizen Petition Tracker, FDA Law Blog, http://www.fdalawblog.net/ 
fda_law_blog_hyman_phelps/files/CPTracker.xls (Oct. 2, 2013) (recording receipt and decision dates 
that span from 181 to 1555 days for late responses); see also Kurt R. Karst, Introducing the FDC Act 
§ 505(q) Citizen Petition Tracker . . . ., FDA Law Blog (Oct. 21, 2008, 11:34 AM), 
http://www.fdalawblog.net/fda_law_blog_hyman_phelps/2008/10/introducing-the.html. In 2008, the 
FDA gave late responses (i.e., 181 days or later after receipt of the petition) to eight citizen petitions, 
with five received that are still pending as of March 2012. FDA Citizen Petition Tracker, supra. In 2009, 
three were given late responses, with one received that is still pending. In 2010, two were given late 
responses, with two received that are still pending. Id. In 2011, the FDA received one that was pending 
past 180 days. Id. The 180-day deadline was revised in 2012, so 2012 numbers were omitted to allow 
for a consistent comparison, though they can be found in the Citizen Petition Tracker, supra. 
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the number of petitions filed on the eve of brand-name product patent 
expiry, combined with the FDA’s limited staff.60 The FDA’s response 
times are likely to worsen as federal funding declines.61 
B. Delaying ANDA Approval with Citizen Petition 
Seeking ANDA approval is a relatively lengthy process. In some 
cases, pharmaceutical companies have attempted to further lengthen this 
process by filing citizen petitions that raise frivolous issues regarding the 
approval of a generic competitor’s ANDA.62 The FDA’s administration of 
its review process for citizen petitions has been a subject of enduring 
concern within the Agency.63 Furthermore, as the ANDA backlog 
continues to grow, delays caused by citizen petitions have become even 
more problematic. The number of citizen petitions filed annually with the 
FDA has increased steadily over the years, from ten in 2001 to thirty-three 
in 2012.64 
Some brand-name manufacturers have taken advantage of the 
increasingly inefficient ANDA process in order to delay approval of 
generic drugs using these “blocking” petitions. Citizen petitions filed to 
fend off generic competition typically object to bioequivalence standards 
or a previous approval of an ANDA.65 Prior to 2007, the FDA would 
automatically suspend ANDA approval in response to any citizen 
petition until the issues presented in the petition were completely 
 
 60. Lee, supra note 48, at 110; see Brown, supra note 40, at 5–6 (citing policies, procedures, 
screening and prioritizing system, management, and failure to implement most recommendations as 
factors contributing to FDA’s ineffective citizen petition process in the 1990s). 
 61. See Dave McCleary, Budget Reductions & User Fees—ANDA approval times?, CUSTOpharm 
Blog (Aug. 10, 2011), http://www.custopharm.com/blog/bid/66365/Budget-reductions-User-Fees-ANDA-
approval-times. 
 62. Hypothetically, competitors may also use the citizen petition process to delay the approval of 
a new brand-name drug. Although the Authors do not know of any cases where this has happened, 
theoretically a competitor could file a citizen petition that raises issues regarding FDA’s approval of 
an NDA. The FDA is required to take final action on any citizen petition relating to new drug 
applications. 21 U.S.C. §§ 355(b)(2), (q)(1)(F) (2013) (listing rules regarding NDAs). A citizen 
petition with the primary intent to delay the approval of an NDA may be denied at any point. Id. 
§ 355(q)(1)(E) (2011); Ctr. for Drug Evaluation & Research, FDA, U.S. Dep’t of Health & 
Human Servs., Guidance for Industry: Citizen Petitions and Petitions for Stay of Action 
Subject to Section 505(q) of the Fed. Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act 4 (2011) [hereinafter FDA, 
Guidance on Citizen Petitions]; see 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(2). 
 63. Lee, supra note 48, at 111; see Brown, supra note 40, at i, 3–4. 
 64. See FDA Citizen Petition Tracker, supra note 59; Michael A. Carrier & Daryl Wander, Citizen 
Petitions: An Empirical Study, 34 Cardozo L. Rev. 249, 269–70 (2012). In addition, the Food and Drug 
Administration Amendments Act of 2007, discussed below, was unsuccessful in slowing down citizen 
petitions submitted to the FDA. Id. at 252 (“After passage of the legislation, the number of filings per 
year increased from 27 to 34. Brand petitions against generics increased from 9 to 16 per year.”). 
 65. See Lars Noah, Adding Insult to Injury: Paying for Harms Caused by a Competitor’s Copycat 
Product, 45 Tort Trial & Ins. Prac. L.J. 673, 680 n.31 (2010). 
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resolved.66 FDA regulations also allow anyone to request that the FDA 
stay the effective date of any administrative action.67 In view of the 
rampant abuse of these mechanisms, the Agency indicated that many of 
these citizen petitions were of dubious merit that appeared to be 
attempts by brand-name manufacturers to manipulate the FDA’s 
processes in order to artificially extend their drugs’ market exclusivities 
past their patent expirations.68 For example, from 2003 to 2006, twenty out 
of twenty-one ANDA-related citizen petitions reviewed by the FDA were 
found to be without merit.69 Many of these meritless petitions were filed by 
brand-name companies during the six-month period just prior to the 
launch date of a generic competitor.70 As of late 2005, FDA officials 
acknowledged ongoing abuses of the citizen petition process.71 
In response to these abuses, Congress passed the Food and Drug 
Administration Amendments Act of 2007 (the “FDAAA”), which added 
§ 505(q) to the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (the “FDCA”).72 
Section 505(q) created a 180-day deadline (now reduced to 150 days under 
the FDA Safety and Innovation Act of 2012, but hereinafter referred to as 
the “180-day period”) for responding to citizen petitions, which was 
intended to limit the adverse impact of citizen petitions on ANDA 
approval.73 The revised FDCA now states that the FDA cannot delay the 
approval of an ANDA as a result of a citizen petition unless the Agency 
“determines, upon reviewing the petition, that a delay is necessary to 
protect the public health.”74 The revisions also address meritless filings of 
citizen petitions based on guidelines issued by the FDA.75 If the FDA 
finds that a petition’s main objective is to delay approval of an ANDA 
without raising legitimate scientific or regulatory issues, then the FDA 
 
 66. See Lee, supra note 48, at 110, 112. That changed with the introduction of the Food and Drug 
Administration Amendments Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-85, 121 Stat. 823 (2007) (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.). 
 67. 21 C.F.R. § 10.35 (2012). 
 68. Sheldon Bradshaw, FDA Chief Counsel, Speech Before the Generic Pharmaceutical 
Association Annual Policy Conference (Sept. 19, 2005) (recording on file with Generic Pharm. Ass’n). 
 69. Press Release, U.S. Senate Special Comm. on Aging, Kohl, Leahy Introduce Bill to Stop 
Frivolous Citizen Petitions, Speed Generic Drug Approval (Sept. 28, 2006) (on file with U.S. Senate). 
 70. See id. 
 71. Letter from Kathleen D. Jaeger, President and CEO, Generic Pharm. Ass’n, to Andrew C. 
Von Eschenbach, Comm’r, FDA (Dec. 15, 2005) (on file with Generic Pharm. Ass’n) [hereinafter 
Letter from Jaeger]. 
 72. Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-85, 121 Stat. 823 
(2007) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.). Section 505(q) was codified as 
21 U.S.C. § 355(q) (2011). 
 73. 21 U.S.C. § 355(q)(1)(F); FDA, Guidance on Citizen Petitions, supra note 62, at 4; see Lee, 
supra note 48, at 112. The FDA Safety and Innovation Action amendments took effect on October 1, 
2012. Food and Drug Administration Safety and Innovation Act, Pub. L. No. 112-144, §§ 106, 1135, 
126 Stat. 993 (2012). 
 74. 21 U.S.C. § 355(q)(1)(A). 
 75. Id. § 355(q)(1)(E). 
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may deny the petition at any time.76 The FDA is considered to have 
taken final agency action on a petition if the Agency makes a final 
decision during the 180-day period or if the 180-day period expires 
without the FDA having made a final decision.77 If a civil action is filed 
against the FDA regarding any issue raised in the petition before the 
FDA has made a final decision, then a court can dismiss the action 
without prejudice for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.78 As for 
ANDA applicants, if a delay beyond the 180-day period is necessary, the 
FDA must notify the applicant within thirty days of making such a 
determination.79 
However, § 505(q) failed to stop abuse of the citizen petition 
process. In 2008, a bipartisan group of legislators from the House and 
Senate expressed concerns that the FDA was not implementing the new 
law aggressively enough.80 In 2009, the FDA released a draft guidance for 
citizen petitions subject to § 505(q).81 The FDA’s interpretation includes 
verification requirements in final citizen petitions, and discusses how the 
Agency determines if § 505(q) applies to a particular petition and 
whether such a petition would delay approval of a pending application.82 
In 2011, the FDA released a final guidance that was substantially similar 
except that the final guidance clarified that the Agency would require strict 
adherence to complete statutory certification and verification statements.83 
In spite of such efforts from the legislature and the FDA, the FDA’s 
regulatory procedures continue to be misused, and its failures tolerated.84 
Although citizen petitions objecting to the FDA’s approval of 
particular ANDAs have been criticized as anticompetitive measures 
against generics, they may be reasonable and even necessary.85 For 
example, questioning the FDA’s safety, efficacy, and bioequivalence 
 
 76. Id. However, the FDA has never actually used this provision to summarily deny a citizen 
petition. Kurt R. Karst, Public Shaming: FDA Edges Closer to Citizen Petition Denial for Intent to 
Delay Generic Drug Approval, But Prefers to Pass the Buck on Enforcement, FDA Law Blog (Aug. 
28, 2013, 7:19 PM), http://www.fdalawblog.net/fda_law_blog_hyman_phelps/2013/08/public-shaming-
fda-edges-closer-to-citizen-petition-denial-for-intent-to-delay-generic-drug-approval.html. 
 77. Id. § 355(q)(2)(A). 
 78. Id. § 355(q)(2)(B). A civil action would be filed against the FDA Secretary. 
 79. Id. § 355(q)(1)(B). 
 80. Press Release, Generic Pharm. Ass’n, GPhA Comments on U.S. Letter Questioning FDA’s 
Implementation of Citizen Petition Reforms (Apr. 11, 2008). 
 81. See Lee, supra note 48, at 113. 
 82. See, e.g., Kurt R. Karst, Reports Detail FDA’s 505(q) Citizen Petition Response Track Record; 
Section 505(q) May Have Some Unintended Consequences, FDA Says (Part I), FDA Law Blog (Jan. 
24, 2011, 4:27 AM), http://www.fdalawblog.net/fda_law_blog_hyman_phelps/2011/01/reports-detail-
fdas-505q-citizen-petition-response-track-record-section-505q-may-have-some-unintende.html; Erin 
A. Lawrence, Citizen Petitions Guidance Finalized, FDA Lawyers Blog (June 15, 2011), 
http://www.fdalawyersblog.com/2011/06/citizen-petitions-guidance-fin.html. 
 83. Lawrence, supra note 82. 
 84. See infra Part IV. 
 85. See Noah, supra note 65, at 680. 
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standards for approving generic drugs can be necessary to mitigate 
possible tort liability for harm caused by the generics. Some state courts 
have extended liability to New Drug Application (“NDA”) holders when 
consumers are harmed by generic copies of their brand-name drugs.86 
This may happen, for example, when patients take a generic version 
while relying on an inadequate warning accompanying a brand-name 
drug.87 Alternatively, under a “market share” theory, patients may sue 
both brand-name and generic manufacturers when they do not know the 
source of the injury-causing drug.88 In this case, courts may be justified in 
imposing tort liability on the brand-name manufacturer even if it was not 
the source of the harm.89 
III.  The NOERR-PENNINGTON Doctrine 
The abusive strategy of filing frivolous citizen petitions in order to 
delay generic entry is made possible by the Noerr-Pennington doctrine.90 
Although generic manufacturers may file antitrust and unfair 
competition lawsuits in response to frivolous citizen petitions, Noerr-
Pennington immunizes brand-name manufacturers from liability for 
petitioning conduct in most cases, even if anticompetitive in nature.91 
A. NOERR-PENNINGTON Immunity 
The Noerr-Pennington doctrine originated from two Supreme Court 
cases, Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, 
Inc. and United Mine Workers v. Pennington, and was expanded by a 
third, California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited. In these 
cases, the Supreme Court held that efforts by individuals or groups to 
petition the government—even for anticompetitive purposes—are 
immune from antitrust liability.92 Noerr-Pennington immunity extends to 
 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. at 684–85. 
 88. Id. at 685–86. If a plaintiff cannot identify which particular manufacturers of a product 
caused plaintiff’s harm, the “market share” theory allows recovery against each manufacturer 
named by plaintiff in proportion to their market share. Restatement (Third) of Torts: Prod. Liab. 
§ 15 cmt. c (1998). 
 89. Noah, supra note 65, at 686; see Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 26 Cal. 3d 588, 610–14 (1980); Martin 
v. Abbott Labs., 102 Wash. 2d 581, 601–07 (1984). 
 90. See Lee, supra note 48, at 99, 116. 
 91. Id. at 109. 
 92. See Cal. Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510 (1972) (“Certainly the 
right to petition extends to all departments of the Government.”); United Mine Workers v. 
Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 670 (1965) (“Noerr shields from the Sherman Act a concerted effort to 
influence public officials regardless of intent of purpose. . . . Joint efforts to influence public officials 
do not violate the antitrust laws even though intended to eliminate competition.”); E. R.R. Presidents 
Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 136–37 (1961) (clarifying that “the Sherman 
Act does not prohibit two or more persons from associating together in an attempt to persuade the 
legislature or the executive to take particular action with respect to a law that would produce a 
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attempts to influence legislators, administrative agencies, courts, and 
foreign governments, even where the attempts to influence are illegal for 
other reasons—for example, bribing government officials.93 The Court 
based this immunity on the First Amendment’s right to petition, finding 
that such immunity was necessary to protect a citizen’s ability to 
participate in government.94 
In Noerr, a group of trucking companies and their trade association 
filed an antitrust lawsuit against major railroads, the presidents of those 
railroads, and their public relations firm.95 The plaintiffs’ complaint 
alleged that the defendants had conspired to restrict trade and 
monopolize the long-distance freight business in violation of the 
Sherman Act.96 The plaintiffs claimed that the defendants’ public 
relations firm lobbied Congress with the sole purpose of injuring the 
truckers, harming their reputation, and impeding their ability to compete 
against railroad companies.97 
The railroad companies, in their defense, maintained that their 
motivation was not to destroy the trucking business but rather to inform 
the public and the legislature of the damage that heavy trucks cause to 
roads and highways.98 They then argued that the Sherman Act was 
inapplicable to efforts to pass or enforce laws, even when the effect was 
to restrain trade or cause monopolization.99 Ironically, the railroad 
companies counterclaimed using an almost identical theory as the 
trucking companies, alleging that the truckers violated the Sherman Act 
by conspiring to destroy the railroad companies’ long-distance freight 
business with negative publicity and adverse legislation.100 
The trial court and the appellate court both sided with the trucking 
companies and found that the railroads had violated the Sherman Act.101 
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Sherman Act did not 
 
restraint or a monopoly” and that the “concept of representation depends upon the ability of the 
people to make their wishes known to their representatives”). 
 93. See Noerr, 365 U.S. at 136; Pennington, 381 U.S. at 670. 
 94. City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Adver., Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 379-80 (1991); see Noerr, 
365 U.S. at 138–39. 
 95. Noerr, 365 U.S. at 129. 
 96. Id.  
 97. Id. The publicity was made to appear generated as independent views when it was actually 
prepared by the public relations firm and paid for by the railroads. The railroads had tried to influence 
legislation and succeeded in persuading the Governor of Pennsylvania to veto a bill that would have 
allowed truckers to carry heavier loads. The plaintiffs sought treble damages and an injunction to 
restrain the railroads from releasing disparaging information about the trucking companies and from 
pressuring the legislature or Governor to further the conspiracy. Id. at 130–31. 
 98. Id. at 131. 
 99. Id. at 131–32. Other defenses included the assertions that the activities complained of were 
protected under the First Amendment and that the trucking companies themselves were barred in pari 
delicto. Id. at 132 n.6. 
 100. Id. at 132. 
 101. Id. at 132–35. 
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make it illegal for entities to collaborate to persuade the government to 
take action, even when it would result in a restraint of trade or 
monopoly.102 Such associations bear, at most, very little resemblance to 
the kind of combinations normally violative of the Sherman Act, such as 
price fixing, boycotts, and market divisions.103 More importantly, the 
Court held that when the railroads lobbied the government to pass laws 
restraining the trucking companies, they were merely exercising their 
constitutional right to petition the government.104 Although the Court 
found no antitrust violation, it noted that antitrust laws may apply in 
cases where such lobbying was “a mere sham to cover what is actually 
nothing more than an attempt to interfere directly with the business 
relationships of a competitor.”105 
In Pennington, the United Mine Workers of America, a coal miners’ 
union, initially filed suit to recover royalty payments from the owners of 
Phillips Brothers Coal Company, a small coal company.106 Phillips cross-
claimed, alleging that United and large coal operators conspired to 
monopolize interstate commerce in violation of the Sherman Act.107 The 
cross-claim alleged that the union and large coal operators thought that 
overproduction was a large concern in the coal industry.108 This allegedly 
led the union and larger companies to agree on measures to place financial 
pressure on smaller companies.109 The union and large companies 
successfully influenced the Secretary of Labor to establish a higher 
minimum wage for employees of contractors selling coal, which made it 
difficult for smaller companies to compete.110 
The trial court and court of appeals found in favor of Phillips, ruling 
that the miners’ union was liable under the Sherman Act.111 Again, the 
Supreme Court reversed and found that Noerr shielded United from 
 
 102. Id. at 135–36, 145. The Court in Noerr mentions “two or more persons” associating together, 
ostensibly violating section 1 of the Sherman Act, which prohibits anticompetitive conspiracies and 
cartels. Citizen petitions in the patented pharmaceutical context implicate section 2 of the Sherman 
Act, which prohibits monopolies. See id. at 136; see also 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (2004). 
 103. Noerr, 365 U.S. at 136. 
 104. Id. at 135–38. 
 105. Id. at 144 (“There may be situations in which a publicity campaign, ostensibly directed toward 
influencing governmental action, is a mere sham to cover what is actually nothing more than an 
attempt to interfere directly with the business relationships of a competitor and the application of the 
Sherman Act would be justified.”). This dictum created the foundation for the sham exception to 
Noerr-Pennington immunity. See discussion infra Part III.B. 
 106. United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 659 (1965). 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. at 660. 
 109. Id. They agreed that eliminating smaller companies would solve the problem, allowing larger 
companies to control the market. Examples include the union abandoning its control over working 
time of miners, agreeing not to oppose the rapid mechanization of mines (which would reduce mine 
employment), and increasing wages. Id. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. at 661. 
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antitrust liability.112 The Court held that the lower courts did not fully 
appreciate the scope of Noerr in their analyses, and stated that Noerr 
protects concerted efforts to influence public officials regardless of 
anticompetitive intent.113 
The Court expanded the scope of the immunity created by Noerr and 
Pennington in California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited.114 In 
addition to generally immunizing attempts to influence the legislative and 
executive branches, California Motor Transport held that the right to 
petition likewise immunizes advocacy through channels and procedures of 
state and federal agencies and courts from antitrust liability.115 The Court 
also revisited Noerr’s dicta concerning sham petitioning,116 which is 
discussed in Part III.B. 
The so-called Noerr-Pennington doctrine that arose from this trilogy 
of cases applies to citizen petitions by brand-name drug manufacturers 
because the citizen petition process is a lawful, statutorily defined means 
of petitioning the FDA—a government agency—to take or refrain from 
taking action. Because of its breadth, this doctrine provides a strong 
defense against antitrust suits filed by generic manufacturers complaining 
about alleged misuse of citizen petitions.117 As an immunity based on a 
First Amendment right,118 the Noerr-Pennington doctrine seems to protect 
a wide variety of activities by brand-name companies that could harm 
generic competitors—for example, filing a citizen petition challenging an 
ANDA just before the filer is about to launch its generic drug. 
Nonetheless, one widely recognized exception to this doctrine exists: the 
“sham” exception.119 
B. The “Sham” Exception 
Noerr-Pennington immunity does not apply to attempts to influence 
government action when the conduct is a “mere sham” covering what is 
actually harassment of a competitor.120 The right to petition under the 
First Amendment may not be used as a pretext for achieving “substantive 
 
 112. Id. at 669–72  
 113. Id. at 669–70. Jury instructions in the trial court had allowed a jury to find an illegal 
conspiracy if there had been an anticompetitive purpose. This is not permitted under Noerr. Id. at 670. 
 114. Cal. Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510 (1972). 
 115. Id. at 510–11 (“Certainly the right to petition extends to all departments of the 
Government.”). 
 116. Id. at 511 (“We said, however, in Noerr that there may be instances where the alleged conspiracy 
‘is a mere sham to cover what is actually nothing more than an attempt to interfere directly with the 
business relationships of a competitor and the application of the Sherman Act would be justified.’”). 
 117. See, e.g., In re Flonase Antitrust Litig., 795 F. Supp. 2d 300 (E.D. Pa. 2011); La. Wholesale 
Drug Co. v. Sanofi-Aventis, No. 07 Civ. 7343(HB), 2009 WL 2708110 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 28, 2009). 
 118. City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Adver., Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 383 (1991); see E. R.R. 
Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 138–39 (1961). 
 119. Lee, supra note 48, at 117. 
 120. Noerr, 365 U.S. at 144; see Cal. Motor Transp., 404 U.S. at 511. 
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evils” that the legislature has authority to control.121 When a competitor 
uses the process of petitioning, as opposed to the outcome, to cause 
anticompetitive harm, Noerr-Pennington protection does not apply.122 
The scope of the sham exception depends on the source, context, and 
nature of the anticompetitive restraint at issue.123 If the anticompetitive 
conduct “is the result of valid governmental action,” those urging the 
action are immune from antitrust liability.124 Similarly, successfully 
influencing legislative and executive action through public or political 
means is almost never a sham.125 However, attempts to influence 
administrative agencies or the judiciary may be deemed a sham based on 
an explicit two-part test under the Supreme Court’s decision in Professional 
Real Estate Investors v. Columbia Pictures Industries.126 
This two-step inquiry is sequential.127 For a petition to be considered 
a sham, it must first be objectively baseless—in other words, no 
reasonable petitioner could realistically expect success on the merits.128 If 
an objective petitioner “could conclude that the [petition] is reasonably 
calculated to elicit a favorable outcome, the [petition] is immunized 
under [Noerr-Pennington], and an antitrust claim premised on the sham 
exception must fail.”129 Loss on the merits of the underlying petition does 
not necessarily equate with objective baselessness, though it may be 
instructive.130 Only if the challenged petition is objectively meritless may 
a court take the second step of examining the petitioner’s subjective, 
 
 121. Cal. Motor Transp., 404 U.S. at 515. 
 122. See Prof’l Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 508 U.S. 49, 60–61 (1993). 
 123. Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 499 (1988). 
 124. Id. If anticompetitive restraint comes from private action, liability may ensue unless the 
restraint is “incidental” to a valid effort to influence governmental action, or it is “genuinely aimed at 
procuring favorable government action.” Id. at 499, 500 n.4. 
 125. Id. at 499–50 (“A publicity campaign directed at the general public, seeking legislation or 
executive action, enjoys antitrust immunity even when the campaign employs unethical and deceptive 
methods.”); see id. at 502 (“The effort to influence governmental action in this case certainly cannot be 
characterized as a sham given the actual adoption of the 1981 Code.”) (emphasis added); see Lee, 
supra note 48, at 118. Contra Noerr, 365 U.S. at 144 (“There may be situations in which a publicity 
campaign, ostensibly directed toward influencing governmental action, is a mere sham to cover what is 
actually nothing more than an attempt to interfere directly with the business relationships of a 
competitor.”). 
 126. Prof’l Real Estate, 508 U.S. at 60. 
 127. La. Wholesale Drug Co. v. Sanofi-Aventis, No. 07 Civ. 7343(HB), 2009 WL 2708110, at *4 
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 28, 2009). 
 128. Prof’l Real Estate, 508 U.S. at 60. The Professional Real Estate exception to Noerr-Pennington 
for sham litigations was extended to sham petitions in Louisiana Wholesale Drug Co., Inc. v. Sanofi-
Aventis, 2009 WL 2708110, at *4 (stating that the two-step inquiry applies to claims of sham litigation 
and petitioning). See infra Part IV.A. Although the following discussion refers to sham petitions, it is 
equally applicable to sham lawsuits. 
 129. Prof’l Real Estate, 508 U.S. at 60. 
 130. Id. at 60 n.5 (noting that courts “must ‘resist the understandable temptation to engage in post 
hoc reasoning by concluding’ that an ultimately unsuccessful ‘action must have been unreasonable or 
without foundation’”). 
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anticompetitive motivation—whether the lawsuit conceals “an attempt to 
interfere directly with the business relationships of a competitor” by 
using the governmental process (i.e., the meritless petition itself) rather 
than the outcome of that process.131 
Although Noerr-Pennington immunity normally applies to citizen 
petitions filed with the FDA, the sham exception comes into play only if 
the citizen petition in question is objectively baseless, possibly because it 
relies on clearly faulty science or a false legal doctrine, or seeks relief that 
is unavailable. If true, a court must also find a subjective intent to cause 
anticompetitive harm, such as delaying generic entry, not through the 
outcome of the citizen petition, but through the citizen petition process 
itself. Several recent court decisions have highlighted this issue, and in 
doing so have also raised questions about the extent of the sham exception. 
IV.  Antitrust Challenges to Citizen Petitions Filed with the 
FDA 
If an allegedly anticompetitive citizen petition succeeds in achieving 
the requested relief, it is by definition a reasonable effort to petition for 
redress and thus not a sham.132 But the reverse is not necessarily true, and 
courts must avoid letting hindsight bias lead them to the conclusion that 
a losing action was baseless. Parties may have reasonable grounds for 
submitting citizen petitions but still lose on the merits.133 Professional Real 
Estate and Noerr-Pennington thus seem to provide an avenue for delaying 
citizen petitions without fear of antitrust liability. If a brand-name 
manufacturer submits a well-supported, though likely-to-fail petition, 
Noerr-Pennington immunity applies and an antitrust countersuit is not 
likely to succeed. This suggests that even a weak citizen petition with no 
reasonable expectation of success on the merits is likely to satisfy the 
threshold inquiry under Professional Real Estate. In order to avoid the 
sham exception to Noerr-Pennington immunity, petitioners merely need to 
demonstrate a reasonable legal or scientific basis for the relief requested. 
The sham exception, however, is far from infallible. It has produced 
confusing standards of “objective baselessness” and raised doubt about a 
jury’s ability to examine data that support legitimate health and safety 
concerns.134 Recent cases demonstrate the varying levels of success that 
 
 131. Id. at 60–61 (quoting Noerr, 365 U.S. at 144). “Of course, even a plaintiff who defeats the 
defendant’s claim to Noerr immunity by demonstrating both the objective and the subjective 
components of a sham must still prove a substantive antitrust violation. Proof of a sham merely 
deprives the defendant of immunity; it does not relieve the plaintiff of the obligation to establish all 
other elements of his claim.” Id. at 61. 
 132. Id. at 60 n.5. But see Carrier, supra note 64, at 266–68 (discussing mixed decisions that are 
“essential denials,” despite providing some relief). 
 133. Prof’l Real Estate, 508 U.S. at 60 n.5. 
 134. See Lee, supra note 48, at 124; see also Prof’l Real Estate, 508 U.S. at 66–67. 
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brand-name manufacturers have had defending against antitrust claims 
by generic manufacturers.135 
A. The Murky Definition of Objective Baselessness Applied—
LOUISIANA WHOLESALE DRUG CO. V. SANOFI-AVENTIS 
Louisiana Wholesale Drug Co. v. Sanofi-Aventis illustrates the 
limitations of sham petition claims.136 This case also interpreted the 
Professional Real Estate sham exception to apply to petitioning, at least 
in some jurisdictions.137 In 1998, Sanofi-Aventis acquired the exclusive 
right to market its anti-rheumatic therapy drug Arava (leflunomide) in 
ten-, twenty- and one-hundred-milligram doses for five and a half 
years.138 In 2004, six generic manufacturers filed ANDAs with the FDA 
seeking to market ten- and twenty-milligram dosages of generic 
leflunomide.139 One year after Aventis’s period of exclusivity ended, and 
one year into FDA review of the ANDA submissions, Aventis filed a 
citizen petition requesting that the FDA require the ANDA applicants to 
perform additional bioequivalence testing.140 The petition further 
requested that the FDA withhold final approval of any ANDA that did 
not seek approval of a 100-milligram tablet that is bioequivalent to 
Arava or did not establish the bioequivalence of five twenty-milligram 
generic tablets to one 100-milligram Arava tablet.141 
In 2005, the FDA denied Aventis’s petition and approved the 
ANDAs on the same day,142 but Aventis had already succeeded in 
keeping its generic competitors off the market for an extra six months.143 
In subsequent litigation, a class of wholesale drug distributors accused 
Aventis of improperly seeking to delay generic entry and violating the 
 
 135. See supra note 23 (discussing reverse payment settlements or authorized generics). 
 136. Lee, supra note 48, at 124. 
 137. See In re Flonase Antitrust Litig., 795 F. Supp. 2d 300, 30910, 310 n.11 (E.D. Pa. 2011) 
(“Although PRE only discussed the sham exception in the context of litigation, the test also generally 
applies to petitions to administrative agencies.” The Third Circuit has “consistently and without 
reservation applied the objective prong to comparable administrative agency petitions.”); La. Wholesale 
Drug Co. v. Sanofi-Aventis, No. 07 Civ. 7343(HB), 2009 WL 2708110, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 28, 2009) 
(stating that the two-step inquiry applies to claims of sham litigation and petitioning). 
 138. La. Wholesale Drug Co., Inc. v. Sanofi-Aventis, No. 07-7343, 2008 WL 4580016, at *1 
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 14, 2008) (summary judgment). 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. at *1–2; see Kurt R. Karst, Recent Rulings Once Again Shine the Light on Sham Citizen 
Petition Antitrust Issues, FDA Law Blog (Feb. 9, 2010), http://www.fdalawblog.net/ 
fda_law_blog_hyman_phelps/2010/02/recent-rulings-once-again-shine-the-light-on-sham-citizen-
petition-antitrust-issues-.html. 
 141. La. Wholesale Drug, 2008 WL 4580016, at *2. 
 142. See id. at *2; La. Wholesale Drug Co., 2009 WL 2708110, at *2 (motion to dismiss). 
 143. The FDA must and did resolve Aventis’s citizen petitions within six months (i.e., 180 days) of 
filing. See 21 C.F.R. § 10.30(e)(2) (2013). 
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antitrust laws by filing a sham citizen petition for anticompetitive 
purposes.144 Aventis invoked the Noerr-Pennington doctrine in its defense.145 
The court described the sham exception test as a “two-step inquiry 
that applies to claims of ‘sham’ petitioning or litigation.”146 Under the 
objective prong of the Professional Real Estate test, the sham petition 
must pursue “claims so baseless that no reasonable [person] could 
realistically expect to secure favorable relief.”147 In the context of filing 
citizen petitions with the FDA, the court stated that the relevant inquiry 
was “whether a reasonable pharmaceutical manufacturer could have 
realistically expected the FDA to grant [the] relief sought by Sanofi-
Aventis in the citizen petition.”148 If not, the petition would be objectively 
baseless and would fail the first prong of the Noerr-Pennington test.149 
After trial, the jury found in favor of Aventis, and plaintiffs moved 
for judgment as a matter of law, which the court denied, holding that a 
reasonable jury could conclude that Aventis’s citizen petition was not 
objectively baseless.150 The evidence available “tended to show that the 
issue raised by the Citizen Petition was sufficiently novel and unsettled to 
allow an objectively reasonable drug company to ‘perceive[] some 
likelihood’ that the FDA would grant the relief requested.”151 This case 
illustrates the vague “objective baselessness” standard, which has been 
inconsistently applied in sham citizen petition cases.152 
 
 144. La. Wholesale Drug Co., 2009 WL 2708110, , at *1–2. 
 145. Id. at *2. 
 146. Id. at *4 (emphasis added). 
 147. Id.; see Prof’l Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 508 U.S. 49, 62 (1993). 
 148. La. Wholesale Drug, 2009 WL 2708110, at *4. 
 149. See id. 
 150. Id. at *7. 
 151. Id. at *4 (quoting Prof’l Real Estate, 508 U.S. at 62). 
 152. Although beyond the scope of this Article, Justice Thomas, in his opinion in Professional Real 
Estate, likened the standard to probable cause in the civil context. See Prof’l Real Estate Investors, Inc. 
v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 508 U.S. 49, 62 (1993). Justices Souter, Stevens, and O’Connor 
concurred in the judgment but noted that the Court erred by referring to “probable cause” and by 
drawing a sharp line where none was needed, as “objectively reasonable lawsuits may still break the 
law.” Id. at 66–67, 75. Different courts have subsequently interpreted the standard to be applied 
differently. Compare In re Terazosin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 335 F. Supp. 2d 1336, 1341–42 
(S.D. Fla. 2004) (reasoning that whether defendant’s sham suits were filed without probable cause 
does not matter because the Court found as a matter of law that defendant had a legal basis for filing 
each suit, and Noerr-Pennington immunity remained intact), with Mitsubishi Heavy Indus., Ltd. v. 
Gen. Elec. Co., 720 F. Supp. 2d 1061, 1066 (W.D. Ark. 2010) (accepting the notion of probable cause 
“in explaining the objective element of sham litigation”). Another issue that is beyond the scope of 
this Article is whether the correct standard of evidence to be applied is that of a preponderance of 
evidence or whether a clear and convincing standard has been created, possibly haphazardly, by 
importing the standard for patent invalidity into the sham litigation question. See In re Wellbutrin XL 
Antitrust Litig., Nos. 08-2431 (direct), 08-2433 (indirect), 2012 WL 1657734, at *4–5, *5 n.7 (E.D. Pa. 
May 11, 2012). 
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B. Sham Petitions and the Reasonable Litigant—IN RE FLONASE 
ANTITRUST LITIGATION 
A second important case, recently settled before trial, concerns 
citizen petitions that GlaxoSmithKline allegedly used to extend its 
monopoly on Flonase, a nasal spray containing fluticasone propionate. 
Flonase is used to treat allergic and non-allergic rhinitis (hay fever) and 
was one of GlaxoSmithKline’s most successful blockbuster drugs.153 At its 
height, GlaxoSmithKline reported sales of Flonase in excess of one billion 
dollars per year.154 As the patents covering Flonase neared expiration, 
GlaxoSmithKline sought to prevent or delay FDA approval of a generic 
Flonase. One stratagem allegedly used by GlaxoSmithKline to delay 
approval of the pending ANDAs for generic Flonase was to file citizen 
petitions raising concerns about the safety and efficacy of the proposed 
generic.155 
Between 2004 and 2005, GlaxoSmithKline filed six different citizen 
petitions with the FDA covering a variety of requests.156 In particular, 
GlaxoSmithKline petitioned the FDA to deny approval of any Flonase 
generics until certain standards were established, despite a lack of any 
research supporting the need for such standards, and the fact that FDA 
approval was granted to Flonase without them.157 Further, performing the 
exact same tests that GlaxoSmithKline used for Flonase approval was 
virtually impossible for a generic manufacturer because GlaxoSmithKline’s 
testing methodologies are proprietary.158 Generic challengers alleged that 
their ANDAs for making generic Flonase were delayed nearly two years 
by GlaxoSmithKline’s numerous citizen petitions while the FDA 
reviewed and responded to each one.159 
Finally in February 2006, more than two years after GlaxoSmithKline’s 
patent on Flonase expired, the FDA denied all of the citizen petitions and 
 
 153. See In re Flonase Antitrust Litig., 795 F. Supp. 2d 300, 301 (E.D. Pa. 2011). 
 154. Am. Sales Co. v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 274 F.R.D. 127, 130, 131 (E.D. Pa. 2010). 
 155. See In re Flonase, 795 F. Supp. 2d at 304. 
 156. Id. at 305–07. GlaxoSmithKlein’s citizen petitions requested that the FDA: (1) “refrain from 
approving ANDAs prior to issuing final guidance,” (2) “require ANDAs to include data from [both 
allergic and non-allergic rhinitis studies],” (3) “require pharmacokinetic data to be collected over the 
entire dosage interval of in vivo tests,” (4) “reconsider its in vitro tests for plume geometry and container 
shelf life,” (5) “reconsider its endorsement of the geometric mean ratio method,” and (6) “tighten 
specifications for [droplet size distribution and spray pattern].” Id. (emphasis added and omitted). 
 157. Id. at 305–08; Complaint at 9, ¶ 45, In re Flonase Antitrust Litig., 795 F. Supp. 2d 300 (E.D. 
Pa. 2011) (No. 09-1638). 
 158. In re Flonase, 795 F. Supp. 2d at 308. 
 159. Complaint at 12, ¶ 59, In re Flonase, 795 F. Supp. 2d 300 (No. 09-1638) (alleging Roxane was 
unable to sell generic Flonase in the U.S. until Mar. 3, 2006, about twenty-two months after 
GlaxoSmithKline’s market exclusivity expired). At the time, the FDA’s policy was to respond to all 
citizen petitions concerning a pending ANDA prior to granting approval. In re Flonase, 795 F. Supp. 
2d at 303 n.6. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(q)(1)(A) (2013); Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act 
of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-85, 121 Stat. 823 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.). 
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approved the first-filed ANDA from Roxane Laboratories on the same 
day.160 The following day, GlaxoSmithKline filed suit against the FDA 
requesting a temporary restraining order barring the ANDA’s approval.161 
The court granted the order but denied the motion for a preliminary 
injunction, and GlaxoSmithKline was forced to pay a multi-million dollar 
bond to cover Roxane’s lost sales.162 
Roxane and two classes of purchasers of Flonase brought suit alleging 
that GlaxoSmithKline violated antitrust laws by filing citizen petitions and 
a lawsuit for the sole purpose of delaying market entry of generic 
Flonase.163 After extensive motion practice and discovery, GlaxoSmithKline 
moved for summary judgment under theories that the plaintiffs could not 
show causation and that their actions were protected by the Noerr-
Pennington doctrine.164 The court denied both motions for summary 
judgment, noting that genuine issues of material fact remained as to 
whether GlaxoSmithKline’s conduct fell under the sham exception to 
Noerr-Pennington immunity.165 
The court referred to Professional Real Estate’s two-step test and 
reemphasized that although the Court in Professional Real Estate only 
discussed the sham exception in deciding cases of “sham” litigation, the 
test also generally applies to petitions.166 GlaxoSmithKline conceded that 
it had an anticompetitive motivation for filing the citizen petitions, 
satisfying the second step of the test.167 Consequently, the plaintiffs’ only 
burden was to show that GlaxoSmithKline’s petitions were objectively 
baseless.168 
 
 160. In re Flonase, 795 F. Supp. 2d at 308. 
 161. Id. GlaxoSmithKline alleged that the approval was “arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of 
discretion, and in violation of the law.” Id. 
 162. Id.; Glaxo Group Ltd. v. Leavitt, 481 F. Supp. 2d 434, 435 (D. Md. 2007). 
 163. In re Flonase, 795 F. Supp. 2d at 301–02, 309; Complaint at 14, In re Flonase Antitrust Litig., 
795 F. Supp. 2d 300 (No. 09-1638) (alleging unlawful maintenance of monopolization under section 2 
of the Sherman Act). 
 164. In re Flonase, 795 F. Supp. 2d at 302. 
 165. Id. at 309. 
 166. Id. at 309–10. See id. at 310 n.11; supra note 137. The Professional Real Estate standard is 
often applied under a clear and convincing evidence standard. Such a standard would require specific 
facts showing genuine issues for trial, rather than unsupported assertions. 800 Adept, Inc. v. Murex 
Secs., Ltd., 539 F.3d 1354, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2008). This standard arose in the context of patent litigation 
but may be applicable in non-patent cases as well, as in In re Flonase. See 795 F. Supp. 2d at 301 
(alleging antitrust violations). But see id. at 311 n.12 (leaving open “what proper standard is in the 
context of a sham petition claim” since either preponderance or clear and convincing evidence was 
sufficient for summary judgment).  
 167. In re Flonase, 795 F. Supp. 2d at 311. 
 168. Id. at 311–12. Courts have sometimes referred to a showing of a realistic expectation of 
success on the merits as a showing of “probable cause.” But this characterization ultimately raises the 
same question as the traditional inquiry—“whether any ‘reasonable litigant could realistically expect 
success on the merits’ of the petition.” Id. at 311. There is still a question, not addressed in this article, 
as to whether a single sham citizen petition can constitute an antitrust violation. In In re Flonase, the 
court held that “conduct is not a sham if ‘at least one claim in the [petition] has objective merit.’” Id. at 
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The court found genuine issues of fact as to whether 
GlaxoSmithKline’s citizen petitions were objectively baseless.169 The court 
also found the lawsuit requesting the temporary restraining order to be 
“objectively baseless.”170 That the temporary restraining order was granted 
only indicated that there was some likelihood that GlaxoSmithKline’s suit 
would succeed on the merits.171 This did not mean that GlaxoSmithKline 
would likely succeed on the merits or even that it had a realistic chance of 
success on the merits.172 However, even though GlaxoSmithKline lost the 
motion for summary judgment, it still succeeded in delaying entry of 
generic Flonase for nearly two years through its filing of citizen petitions.173 
C. Partial Success and Causation—IN RE WELLBUTRIN XL ANTITRUST 
LITIGATION 
In In re Wellbutrin XL Antitrust Litigation, purchasers of Wellbutrin 
XL brought an antitrust case against Biovail and GlaxoSmithKline, the 
producers and distributors of the once-a-day antidepressant, alleging that 
they illegally conspired to prevent generic versions from entering the 
market.174 The complaint argued that defendants schemed to delay 
generic entry of extended-release bupropion hydrochloride into the 
market by, among other things, filing an allegedly baseless citizen 
petition with the FDA.175 The plaintiffs claimed that this scheme delayed 
the entry of cheaper alternatives to Wellbutrin XL from November 2005 
 
312 (citing Dentsply Int’l, Inc. v. New Tech. Co., No. 06-0272, 1996 U.S. Dist. Lexis 19846 (D. Del. 
Dec. 19, 1996)). The courts in Wellbutrin SR and Wellbutrin XL also found that a single objectively 
baseless petition or lawsuit can constitute a sham under Professional Real Estate. See In re Wellbutrin 
SR Antitrust Litig., 749 F. Supp. 2d 260, 263–64 (E.D. Pa. 2010); see also In re Wellbutrin XL Antitrust 
Litig., Nos. 08-2431, 08-2433, 2012 WL 1657734 (E.D. Pa. May 11, 2012). 
 169. In re Flonase, 795 F. Supp. 2d at 317. See id. at 312–16 (addressing each petition and why 
plaintiffs’ evidence raise genuine issues of fact). 
 170. Id. at 317. 
 171. Id. at 316. 
 172. Id. at 317. Also, GlaxoSmithKline’s motion for a preliminary injunction failed because the 
judge who denied it “simply . . . [didn’t] see any likelihood that [GlaxoSmithKline was] going to 
prevail.” Id. 
 173. See id. at 305, 308 (describing how GlaxoSmithKline’s first citizen petition was on May 19, 
2004, and the FDA denied the citizen petitions and approved Roxane’s ANDA on Feb. 22, 2006.; the 
temporary restraining order was granted on Feb. 24, 2006, but GlaxoSmithKline’s motion for a 
preliminary injunction was denied on Mar. 7, 2006); Complaint at 9, ¶ 45, In re Flonase Antitrust 
Litig., 795 F. Supp. 2d 300 (E.D. Pa 2011) (No. 09-1638). 
 174. In re Wellbutrin XL Antitrust Litig., 282 F.R.D. 126, 131 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 15, 2011); In re 
Wellbutrin XL Antitrust Litig., No. 08-2431, 2012 WL 1657734, at *1 (E.D. Pa. May 11, 2012). Direct 
purchasers include Meijer, Inc. and Rochester Drug Co-Operative, Inc. Memorandum for Direct 
Purchasers’ Consolidated, in opposition to motions to dismiss, In re Wellbutrin XL Antitrust Litig., 
No. 08-2431, 2012 WL 1657734, at n.3. Indirect purchasers include employee welfare benefit plans and 
Aetna Health of California. In re Wellbutrin XL, 2011 WL 3563835, at *1. 
 175. See In re Wellbutrin XL, 2012 WL 1657734, at *1. The plaintiffs also alleged that Biovail and 
GlaxoSmithKline further schemed to keep generic Wellbutrin XL off the market by filing multiple 
sham patent infringement lawsuits and then entering into settlements with the generic companies. Id. 
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to December 2006 for the 300-milligram generic and to May 2008 for the 
150-milligram generic.176 The delayed generic entry allowed Biovail and 
GlaxoSmithKline to generate more than one-billion dollars in additional 
revenue in 2006 alone.177 
Biovail and GlaxoSmithKline moved for summary judgment under 
the Noerr-Pennington doctrine.178 The court granted the motion, finding 
that the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate the existence of a conspiracy.179 
The evidence suggested that the two companies independently considered 
the filing of a citizen petition.180 While GlaxoSmithKline decided not to 
file a petition, Biovail filed one on December 20, 2005 to request that the 
generic version of Wellbutrin XL satisfy four criteria.181 The petition was 
granted only with respect to two criteria.182 Thus, it would seem that 
GlaxoSmithKline and Biovail had immunity, as a successful petition is 
deemed reasonable per se under Professional Real Estate. However, the 
court did not decide whether the two rejected criteria were shams, or 
whether petitions with a mix of sham and non-sham requests may be 
considered objectively baseless as a whole.183 
Regardless, the plaintiffs failed to offer any evidence to suggest that 
the FDA would have approved the ANDAs for generic Wellbutrin XL 
any earlier if the petition had been limited to only the two successful 
criteria.184 Thus, the court found that the plaintiffs failed to show 
evidence from which a jury could reasonably infer that Biovail and 
GlaxoSmithKline conspired to delay generic entry by filing the allegedly 
sham citizen petition.185 
D. A Lack of Convincing Evidence as Sham—IN RE DDAVP DIRECT 
PURCHASER ANTITRUST LITIGATION 
The In re DDAVP litigation illustrates the application of the pleading 
standard to alleging civil claims relating to sham litigation and sham citizen 
petitions.186 In 1991, Ferring B.V. and Ferring Pharmaceuticals acquired a 
patent covering the tablet form of DDAVP (desmopressin acetate), an 
 
 176. In re Wellbutrin XL, 282 F.R.D. at 132. 
 177. Lee, supra note 48, at 114; see Biovail Provides 2006 Guidance, Bus. Wire (Mar. 23, 2006, 7:30 
AM), http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20060323005215/en/Biovail-2006-Guidance. 
 178. In re Wellbutrin XL, 2012 WL 1657734, at *1. 
 179. Id. at *34–35. Notably, the court regarded one of the alleged sham lawsuits as a “close 
question,” which does not fit the profile of objectively baseless litigation. Id. at *20. 
 180. Id. at *39. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. at *21–24. 
 183. Id. at *28. 
 184. Id. at *34. 
 185. Id. at *35. 
 186. See generally Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (setting the standard for pleading 
facts in a civil claim to be one that is “plausible on its face”). 
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antidiuretic prescription medication.187 Aventis Pharmaceuticals had an 
exclusive license from Ferring to market and sell these tablets under the 
DDAVP name.188 In 2002, Barr Laboratories filed an ANDA with a 
paragraph IV certification, seeking to market a generic version of 
DDAVP.189 Ferring brought suit for infringement but the district court 
found Ferring’s patent unenforceable because of inequitable conduct 
before the Patent and Trademark Office.190 In February 2006, the Federal 
Circuit concluded that Ferring “deliberately concealed” that several 
scientists who submitted declarations in support of Ferring’s patent 
application had either been employed or received research funds from 
Ferring.191 
Two months later, direct purchasers of DDAVP filed an antitrust 
lawsuit against Ferring and Aventis.192 The plaintiffs alleged that Ferring 
and Aventis had, among other things, filed a sham citizen petition for the 
purpose of delaying the FDA’s final approval of Barr’s ANDA.193 The 
defendants jointly moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the 
plaintiffs lacked standing to assert the antitrust violations.194 Aventis 
separately argued that the plaintiffs had not sufficiently alleged 
misconduct.195 
The district court granted both motions and dismissed the suit for 
failure to plead fraud with sufficient particularity.196 The district court also 
rejected the claim regarding the citizen petition because the defendants 
had not acted in bad faith and the plaintiffs could not plausibly show the 
existence of a sham.197 
The Second Circuit vacated the summary judgment, applying a low 
standard on scienter at the pleading stage and allowing “fairly tenuous 
inferences” because such issues are appropriately resolved by triers of 
fact.198 In particular, the Second Circuit disagreed with the district court 
 
 187. In re DDAVP Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litig., 585 F.3d 677, 682 (2d Cir. 2009). 
 188. Id. The FDA also approved an NDA for Aventis for the tablets. Id. 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. at 683. 
 191. Id. 
 192. Id. 
 193. Id. The plaintiffs also alleged that the defendants (1) obtained the patent through fraud 
and/or inequitable conduct, (2) improperly listed the patent in the Orange Book, and (3) prosecuted 
sham infringement litigation against generic competitors. Id. 
 194. Id. 
 195. Id. at 683–84. 
 196. Id. at 684. 
 197. Id. at 684, 694. 
 198. Id. at 693, 695. The court also found adequate allegation with regard to the plaintiff’s sham 
litigation claim. Id. at 694. Based on the defendants’ inequitable conduct of not disclosing material 
information to the Patent and Trademark Office, and the notion that the high materiality of the 
omission could overcome the relatively weak evidentiary support for intent, plaintiffs’ allegations 
passed muster. See id. at 693–94. 
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that the citizen petition was protected by the First Amendment and that 
the plaintiffs could not plausibly show the requisite objective and 
subjective baselessness for a sham.199 The FDA found neither “convincing 
evidence” nor basis for the arguments contained in the citizen petition.200 
In addition, the district court previously suggested that the petition might 
have been an anticompetitive litigation tactic designed to keep generic 
competition from entering the market as long as possible after the patent 
expired.201 Thus, the court found that the plaintiffs could plausibly show 
the petition to have been a sham and that summary judgment was 
therefore improper.202 
This case sheds light on the types of evidence required to assert a 
claim of sham petition against a brand-name manufacturer. Even where 
citizen petitions and litigation are both involved, an antitrust case relying 
on the sham exception can be pleaded, at least sufficiently to survive a 
motion to dismiss. 
V.  Strategic Considerations for Practitioners 
As Part IV indicated, brand-name and generic manufacturers can 
file citizen petitions in order to protect their profits. Lawyers played a 
central role in representing their client companies in ways that aligned 
their interests with the relevant legal standard: the two-part sham 
exception test. The following sections discuss strategic considerations 
and precautions for lawyers on both sides of an antitrust suit challenging 
an alleged sham petition. 
A. Sound Scientific Basis 
It is extremely difficult for an antitrust plaintiff to prove liability 
when a citizen petition has a sound scientific basis, even if it is far-
fetched. By contrast, courts are likely to find that citizen petitions with 
no discernible sound scientific basis, or that employ clearly faulty science 
or logic, have no “reasonable likelihood of success.” Thus, petitioners 
can bolster their defense against possible antitrust claims by ensuring 
that their petitions have a sound scientific basis. 
The FDA’s submission rules for citizen petitions require the petition 
to include a statement of grounds upon which the action relies.203 Citizen 
 
 199. Id. at 694. 
 200. Id. 
 201. Id. 
 202. See id at 695. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“A claim has facial plausibility 
when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that 
the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. The plausibility standard is not akin to a 
‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted 
unlawfully.” (citations omitted)). 
 203. 21 C.F.R. § 10.30(b) (2013). 
3. Avery_23 (Do Not Delete) 12/2/2013 1:18 PM 
December 2013]       SHAM CITIZEN PETITIONS 141 
petitions are categorized by the FDA into two groups: those that raise 
scientific issues and those that raise solely legal or procedural issues.204 If 
the FDA finds that a submission’s primary objective is to delay approval 
of an ANDA without raising legitimate scientific or regulatory issues, 
then the FDA may deny the petition at any time.205 It thus behooves an 
entity submitting a petition on a scientific basis (as opposed to purely 
legal) to include sound scientific backing and ample evidentiary support. 
Even if the subjective purpose behind a citizen petition is to delay 
approval of an ANDA and to extend the petitioner’s period of market 
exclusivity, a sound scientific basis can defeat a sham suit if the requested 
relief—even if far-fetched—is not “objectively baseless.”206 
The chances for a petition without sound scientific and evidentiary 
support to be found objectively baseless is significantly higher than one 
that employs even far-fetched but well-argued and mainstream scientific 
theories.207 Generic manufacturers affected by a citizen petition will 
almost certainly argue there is no scientific or medical basis for a brand-
name manufacturer to request a certain action from the generic.208 They 
will also likely offer evidence that the relief requested in the citizen 
petition is contrary to FDA statutes, regulations, and practices.209 
Extensive evidence and a sound and logical scientific basis for the petition 
can defeat such arguments. 
For example, if in In re Flonase Antitrust Litigation GlaxoSmithKline 
had included in its citizen petitions data showing that its original delivery 
mechanism, with less concise spray pattern and droplet size distribution, 
were significantly less effective or even dangerous compared to their 
newer spray bottle (thus denigrating their own original product and 
justifying a new, more stringent standard), it would be difficult to argue 
that their citizen petitions were objectively baseless such that a petitioner 
could not reasonably expect success on the merits.210 Without such data, 
GlaxoSmithKline’s citizen petitions essentially argued that Flonase was 
 
 204. Molzon, supra note 42, at 281. Lee, supra note 48, at 110. 
 205. 21 U.S.C. § 355(q)(1)(E) (2011). But as mentioned previously, the FDA has never actually 
used this provision to summarily deny a petition. See Karst, supra note 76.  
 206. See In re Flonase Antitrust Litig., 795 F. Supp. 2d 300, 315 n.16 (E.D. Pa. 2011) (quoting Prof’l 
Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 508 U.S. 49, 60 (1993)) (noting that a 
citizen petition to the FDA requires more than any arguable scientific basis and that “the objective 
prong requires . . . a realistic chance of ‘elicit[ing] a favorable outcome’”). 
 207. See Prof’l Real Estate, 508 U.S. at 60–61. 
 208. See, e.g., La. Wholesale Drug Co. v. Sanofi-Aventis, No. 07 Civ. 7343(HB), 2009 WL 2708110, 
at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 28, 2009) (plaintiff arguing that defendants knew that there was no difference 
from a safety or efficacy standpoint between brand-name and generic doses and consequently there 
was no scientific or medical basis for defendants to request that generic manufacturers seek approval). 
 209. See, e.g., id. at *2 (plaintiff offering evidence and argument at trial that defendant’s citizen 
petition lacked scientific or medical basis and that the relief requested was against FDA regulations). 
 210. Of course, this would effectively require GlaxoSmithKline to admit that its earlier product 
was unsafe or ineffective. 
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safe when released but that the FDA should require greater measures of 
safety for generics. Even if a citizen petition is unlikely to succeed, a well-
reasoned scientific argument with data to support it will turn the issue 
into a legitimate battle of the experts and will make antitrust suits less 
likely to succeed. 
Brand-name manufacturers should be familiar with such tactics, as 
they can also use a lack of sound scientific basis to oppose ANDAs. 
Under the rules for ANDA approval, the application must contain, inter 
alia, information showing that the new drug’s conditions of use have 
been previously approved for another drug and that the active ingredient 
of the new drug is the same as that of the approved drug.211 The lack of a 
sound scientific basis in an ANDA may be raised in a citizen petition 
itself or in subsequent litigation.212 Brand-name manufacturers may also 
employ other means to attack ANDAs, such as asking the FDA to 
require other types of statistical analysis and to not approve ANDAs 
until the FDA finalizes its guidance documents for establishing 
bioequivalence.213 In short, for a citizen petition to be successful, the filer 
should ensure that the petition contains a sound scientific basis and 
determine whether the ANDA itself may lack enough scientific backing 
to pass as a new, bioequivalent generic drug. 
B. Subjective Intent 
The second prong of the “sham” inquiry tests the subjective intent 
of the citizen petition filer.214 While a company is not likely to admit to 
having an anticompetitive intent, discovery provides a glimpse into the 
company’s internal discussions and deliberations. With internal 
memoranda, emails, presentations, and other documents, one can paint a 
picture of a corporation’s intent or purpose behind filing a citizen petition. 
For instance, in In re Flonase Antitrust Litigation, defendant 
GlaxoSmithKline requested through a citizen petition that the FDA 
tighten specifications for droplet size distribution and spray pattern for 
generic manufacturers of Flonase nasal-spray device.215 Plaintiff Roxane’s 
expert testimony asserted that the FDA’s existing specifications 
sufficiently ensured public safety and that the FDA could address any 
concerns with post-marketing supplements.216 In fact, Flonase’s own 
specifications had been tightened through post-market supplements after 
 
 211. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A) (2011). 
 212. See, e.g., In re Flonase Antitrust Litig., 795 F. Supp. 2d 300, 305 (E.D. Pa. 2011). 
 213. See, e.g., id. at 305–07 (detailing brand-name defendant’s citizen petitions discussing statistical 
methods and draft guidance documents). 
 214. See Prof’l Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 508 U.S. 49, 60–61 (1993). 
 215. In re Flonase, 795 F. Supp. 2d at 315. 
 216. Id. at 316. 
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its NDA.217 Discovery of notes from one of GlaxoSmithKline’s strategy 
meetings revealed that GlaxoSmithKline explicitly recognized this fact 
and anticipated it to apply to generic companies.218 
As with many antitrust cases, internal email control and education 
about practical application of the antitrust laws are crucial to avoiding 
antitrust liability. Plaintiff’s lawyers have won many a case or earned a 
larger settlement simply because a defendant’s internal emails and 
memoranda overtly stated that it was doing something for anticompetitive 
purposes.219 
On the other hand, GlaxoSmithKline was able to point to an 
internal Roxane email admitting that GlaxoSmithKline’s arguments in 
one of its petitions were strong and scientifically based.220 Even though 
the question in In re Flonase was whether GlaxoSmithKline’s citizen 
petitions had an objective basis rather than subjective desire to exclude 
generics from the market, the court conceded that an email may constitute 
evidence that Roxane believed that the petition raised strong arguments.221 
Although Roxane’s interpretation of the citizen petitions was not at issue, 
such an email likely would have been persuasive at trial.222 
Internal communications are a primary source for determining 
subjective intent in antitrust cases.223 Absent emails, memoranda, 
presentations, and other sources exhibiting anticompetitive purpose 
behind—or a disbelief in the merits of—citizen petitions, antitrust 
plaintiffs would face a difficult task of proving subjective intent. 
 
 217. Id. 
 218. Id. (quoting the defendant’s notes to state: “Given that the FDA has worked with us for 3 
years to address [spray pattern and droplet size distribution], it is likely that the [FDA] will give a 
generic company some leeway in addressing any similar criteria issues”). 
 219. See, e.g., Eric Lai, Microsoft Settles Embarrassing Antitrust Suit in Iowa, PCWorld (Feb. 15, 
2007, 10:16 AM), 
http://www.pcworld.idg.com.au/article/4418/microsoft_settles_embarrassing_antitrust_suit_iowa 
(indicating the internal emails and documents suggested not only anticompetitive practices by the 
defendant company but embarrassing subjective mindset of its employees); Dylan McGrath, Update: NY 
Files Antitrust Suit Against Intel, EE Times (Nov. 4, 2009, 5:00 PM), 
http://www.eetimes.com/documents.asp?doc_id=1172172 (reporting the emails to defendant from other 
companies in the industry showed the defendant’s intent to commit anticompetitive acts). 
 220. In re Flonase, 795 F. Supp. 2d at 316. 
 221. Id. 
 222. See id. (stating that the email evidences subjective belief but does not answer the question 
whether the objective prong of the Professional Real Estate test is met). 
 223. See Ronald A. Cass & Keith N. Hylton, Antitrust Intent, 74 S. Cal. L. Rev. 657, 732 (2000) 
(“[I]t is unlikely that every firm would gain [enough sophistication to avoid liability by watching their 
words]. At the same time, subjective intent to harm competition would be apt, in many instances, to be 
predicated on internal documents that . . . are far from compelling. This, however, is likely to be the 
direct evidence of subjective intent that is available.”). Scholars have urged courts to consider internal 
documents and comments directly from corporate officers in discovering a monopolist’s subjective 
intent. Id. at 658. 
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VI.  Suggestions for Regulating Sham Citizen Petitions 
In the midst of inconsistent and confusing application of the sham 
exception to Noerr-Pennington, the FDA and courts can work together 
to safeguard the citizen petition process from misuse. For example, the 
proposed Citizen Petition Fairness and Accuracy Act of 2006 would have 
given the FDA the power to sanction those who filed citizen petitions 
simply to keep competition off the market.224 The bill included possible 
sanctions such as a fine of up to one million dollars, permanent revocation 
of the right to file citizen petitions, and dismissal of the petition.225 The bill 
would also have ended excessive delays in generic entry by instructing 
the FDA to review all citizen petitions within six months of filing.226 
Subsequently, many of these provisions were incorporated in the 
FDAAA.227 But recent research has suggested that the abuses FDAAA 
was meant to curb have not been affected.228 A number of reforms, both 
regulatory and judicial, could prove more effective. 
A. Regulatory Reforms 
To the extent that citizen petitions are being misused to delay 
generic competition, certain provisions of the Hatch-Waxman Act could 
be modified in order to deter misuse or to mitigate the effects of misuse. 
This was part of the intent of FDAAA, but it has not stemmed the tide of 
citizen petitions.229 Furthermore, as discussed in Part IV, some patentees 
continue to file sham petitions for anticompetitive purposes. The 
following regulatory reforms could be useful in preventing abuse of the 
citizen petition process. 
1. Heighten Requirements for Disclosure of Information 
The FDA should implement a multi-level review process to screen 
out improper or unfounded petitions based on disclosed conflicts. For 
example, to help the FDA evaluate whether a petition’s main objective is 
to delay approval of an ANDA, the Agency could require submission of 
more information concerning the circumstances under which a petition is 
filed. Five requirements would be particularly useful to the FDA’s initial 
review: (1) an accurate statement of procedural history, (2) an indication 
 
 224. Lee, supra note 48, at 125; Press Release, U.S. Senate Special Comm. on Aging, supra 
note 69. The bill specifically granted the sanctioning power to the Department of Health and Human 
Services. Presumably, sanctions would have been issued by the FDA in practice. 
 225. Press Release, U.S. Senate Special Comm. on Aging, supra note 69. 
 226. Id. 
 227. Pub. L. No. 110-85, 121 Stat. 823 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.); 
21 U.S.C. § 355(q) (2011); see Lee, supra note 66, at 112–13. 
 228. See, e.g., Carrier, supra note 64, at 249 (discussing subsequent increase in filing of citizen 
petitions and decline in success rate from twenty percent to nineteen percent). 
 229. See, e.g., id. (noting that legislation has not been successful in reducing the number of petitions). 
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of any pending ANDAs or NDAs the citizen petition would affect, (3) a 
statement of financial interest, including financial relationships of any kind 
to the stakeholders, (4) a statement of likely financial impact, and (5) a 
corporate disclosure statement indicating any corporate relationships 
between affected parties. With this screening information at the outset, the 
FDA could quickly identify “suspect” petitions—such as those having a 
main purpose of delay— for secondary screening. Petitions involving large 
sums of money or that are filed shortly before ANDA approval is 
expected on a blockbuster drug might be subject to additional review to 
weed out clearly improper petitions, or to designate pressing petitions for 
immediate review to avoid financial loss. Falsification of screening 
information could be subject to harsh fines and outright denial of the 
citizen petition. 
In concert with the screening process, the FDA should require 
petitioners to provide full disclosure of conflicts of interest, such as 
financial interests as noted above, in the approval or submission of the 
petition.230 For example, petitioners could be required to certify that: 
(1) petitioners have submitted all information the petition relies on, 
(2) the petition is legally and factually well grounded, (3) it is submitted 
in good faith, and (4) the petition includes all available information that 
is unfavorable to the petition.231 Although these additional certifications 
would burden all petitioners, they may also deter improperly motivated 
citizen petitions. Further, the proposed certification requirement could 
be given teeth by imposing a bond or potential penalties where delay of 
ANDA approval is sought. As noted above, this process would allow the 
FDA to identify and potentially screen out the petitions that are likely to 
be improperly motivated. 
2. Adopt More Efficient Methods of Review 
The FDA should adopt more efficient methods of review to 
improve response rates under the new proposed rule, or other changes 
that would urge adherence to the timeframe for all petitions rather than 
most petitions. The FDA currently reviews a citizen petition’s legal and 
scientific issues consecutively.232 Instead, the petitions should be routed 
based on whether they raise legal issues, scientific issues, or both.233 If a 
petition raises both legal and scientific issues, both issues should be 
reviewed in parallel by appropriate personnel.234 The review process 
could also be improved by implementing a tracking system to monitor 
 
 230. Letter from Jaeger, supra note 71. 
 231. See id. The fourth proposed requirement is already required by § 10.20 certifications. 
21 C.F.R. § 10.30(b) (2013). 
 232. See Letter from Jaeger, supra note 71. 
 233. See id. 
 234. See Lee, supra note 48, at 125–26. 
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how the FDA handles citizen petitions, which would help to identify 
systemic deficiencies or potential improvements.235 
3. Time Restrictions on Submitting Citizen Petitions 
Imposing a deadline to submit citizen petitions prior to ANDA 
approval could further deter abuse of the process. For example, the FDA 
could refuse to consider, for purposes of ANDA approval, citizen 
petitions submitted less than nine months from the pioneer’s patent 
expiration date.236 Alternatively, the Agency could provide would-be 
petitioners with a comment period consisting of a predetermined number 
of days in which they could submit citizen petitions concerning a 
submitted ANDA, similar to the predefined comment period for citizens 
to respond to a proposed FDA rule.237 Limiting opportunities to interfere 
with the ANDA approval process through such restrictions would stop 
dubious eleventh-hour citizen petitions and require petitioners to put 
forth their best arguments in a timely manner. Under this system, the 
FDA could review citizen petitions with fewer delays and thus determine 
whether to approve generic entry more rapidly.238 
Another option is for the FDA to implement some type of 
“abbreviated citizen petition” process that would put the FDA on notice 
about concerns without making formal requests for action. The Agency 
could respond to an abbreviated petition by determining whether the 
concerns are prima facie legitimate, prioritizing them based on 
legitimacy, and then requesting a more formal “non-abbreviated” citizen 
petition for the highest priority concerns. This would essentially make 
the filing of a citizen petition an organic process that would raise all 
concerns at the outset and allow the FDA to engage in a conversation 
with the filer. The FDA could then specify what further evidence would 
be required to warrant the relief requested, strictly control the review 
schedule, and eliminate the need to review evidence that cannot support 
such relief. 
4. Prima Facie Review of Intent 
The FDA should exercise its discretion to determine whether citizen 
petitions concerning ANDA review appear to be anticompetitive by 
determining whether such petitions are filed with an intent to delay 
ANDA approval. Under § 505(q)(1)(E), if the Agency finds that a 
petition’s main purpose is to delay ANDA approval, then it may deny 
 
 235. See Letter from Jaeger, supra note 71. 
 236. Id. 
 237. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2012) (“[T]he agency shall give interested persons an opportunity to 
participate in the rule making through submission of written data, views, or arguments with or without 
opportunity for oral presentation.”); Lee, supra note 48, at 126. 
 238. See Letter from Jaeger, supra note 71. 
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the petition at any time.239 However, the FDA has never actually denied a 
petition based on such a finding and has refused to issue guidance on 
how such an intent to delay might be determined.240 Consequently, it is 
not at all clear and when a citizen petition could be summarily denied 
based on the Agency’s finding of intent to delay.  
In order to give § 505(q)(1)(E) some teeth, the FDA should issue 
guidelines defining what it means for a petition to have a “main purpose 
of delay,” “intent to delay,” or when a petition is a “delaying petition,” 
then refer dubious petitions to the Federal Trade Commission or 
Department of Justice for antitrust analysis or criminal investigation.241 
Because the FDA is capable of determining factual issues for agencies 
and judges, such a referral could create a presumption that the FDA’s 
determinations regarding delaying intent are correct. Such a presumption 
may be justified given the FDA’s experience in reviewing citizen 
petitions and its history of maintaining the dialogue between industry 
and the government. This would lead to deterrence in the courts as well 
because of the presumption against sham petitioners. 
A consequence of the FDA’s free reign to deny citizen petitions is 
that brand-name manufacturers who petitioned to keep generics off the 
market may vigorously challenge such denials. However, the Agency is in 
a favorable position to deny petitions while simultaneously fending off 
any suits from aggrieved petitioners. It has long been established that a 
purely legal challenge to a “final agency action” may not be fit for 
judicial review.242 Denial of a petition that could affect the approval of a 
related ANDA submitted by a generic competitor constitutes “final 
agency action,” and a challenge to such denial may not be ripe until the 
Agency makes a concrete determination on the related generic 
application.243 Consequently, the FDA can indefinitely defend or dismiss 
suits by petitioners who are denied until it approves the generic drug that 
the petitioners opposed in the first place. This gives the Agency 
maneuvering room to issue clarifying guidance or exercise its discretion. 
 
 239. 21 U.S.C. § 355(q)(1)(E) (2011) (stating that if the FDA determines that a petition “was 
submitted with the primary purpose of delaying the approval of an application and the petition does 
not on its face raise valid scientific or regulatory issues,” the FDA may deny the petition at any time). 
 240. See Karst, supra note 76. 
 241. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(q)(1)(E) (2013) (using language such as “primary purpose of delaying the 
approval” and denial based on “intent to delay”). 
 242. See AstraZeneca Pharm. LP v. FDA, 850 F. Supp. 2d 230, 242 (D.D.C. 2012). 
 243. Id. For example, on March 13, 2012, AstraZeneca sued the FDA to overturn the Agency’s 
recent decision that rejected without comment two citizen petitions aimed at preventing approval of 
generic versions of Seroquel or Seroquel XR. Id. at 230. Ten days later, the court denied 
AstraZeneca’s request for injunction. Id. at 251. The FDA only tentatively approved ANDAs 
referencing Seroquel, so AstraZeneca failed to show a likelihood of success on the merits. Id. at 244–
48. The “‘controversy’ envisioned by AstraZeneca in this action may never ripen into a dispute 
amenable to judicial review.” Id. at 248. 
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5. Lengthen and Enforce the Time Period for Response 
The source of the problem with citizen petition misuse is the time it 
takes to approve or deny the petitions and the FDA’s failure to act on 
ANDAs in the interim. The FDA has increasingly failed to meet the 
statutory response time, which was previously 180 days and has now been 
reduced to 150 days. Now that the FDA has even less time to respond to 
citizen petitions, it seems even more likely that the Agency will fail to 
respond in a timely manner. Consequently, changes in regulations should 
first target this aspect of the citizen petition process.244 
One option arises from the rule that requires the FDA to notify an 
ANDA applicant within thirty days if the FDA’s response to an ANDA 
will be delayed beyond 180 days.245 If the FDA imported a similar rule 
requiring the Agency to notify ANDA applicants of anticipated delays 
caused by citizen petitions in a timely manner, it may encourage the 
FDA to stop ignoring the time limit and increase the response rate. 
A second solution would be to require a response to a citizen 
petition even if the FDA has not completed its review within the 
imposed response period or has not acted on related ANDAs. While this 
solution is supported by the recently amended law prohibiting the FDA 
from delaying ANDA approval in response to citizen petitions unless the 
delay is necessary to protect the public health, it carries the risk that the 
FDA will release superficial or incomplete responses.246 
A third alternative would be to expand, rather than reduce, the time 
limit.247 However, petitions that did not receive a response within 180 
days were typically delayed for more than a year.248 Expanding the time 
limit for the sake of the relatively few petitions that receive late responses 
could increase the average response time and create more delays in the 
otherwise-timely petition process. 
 
 244. Grittner, supra note 54, § 3833; see Lee, supra note 48, at 110; Brown, supra note 40, at 3; 
Karst, OGD Finished 2010 on a High Note—Really High!, supra note 25 (stating that the “FDA rarely 
ever meets that statutory requirement”). Note that the response time shrunk to 150 days in late 2012. 
See text accompanying supra note 73. 
 245. 21 U.S.C. § 355(q)(1)(B) (2011). 
 246. See id. § 355(q)(1)(A) (specifying that ANDAs will not be delayed by pending citizen petitions 
or petitions for stay of action unless “a delay is necessary to protect public health”); FDA, Fourth 
Annual Report on Delays in Approvals of Applications Related to Citizen Petitions and Petitions 
for Stay of Agency Action for Fiscal Year 2011 at 3 (2012) (reporting that a particular delay in 
approving an ANDA was based on a concern that an ex post facto conclusion that an argument against 
approval had merit would negatively affect public health). Furthermore, the FDA has concerns that this 
rule “may not be discouraging the submission of petitions that do not raise valid scientific issues and are 
intended primarily to delay the approval of competitive drug products.” Id. at 6. 
 247. See Food and Drug Administration Safety and Innovation Act, Pub. L. No. 112-144, §§ 106, 
1135, 126 Stat. 993 (2012); see also supra note 73 and accompanying text. Whether the reduction of the 
time limit to 150 days improves the response rate remains to be seen, however. 
 248. See FDA Citizen Petition Tracker, supra note 59. 
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A two-pronged approach—extending the period to make review 
more feasible and giving the requirement teeth to make it a hard 
deadline—could significantly improve the current system. Legitimate 
petitions would be less likely to get shortchanged, and improper petitions 
would have to be denied in a timely manner. 
B. Judicial Guidance 
A judicial approach to overseeing the citizen petition process should 
come from both judicial deference and a new look at the sham exception 
in light of the abuse of the petition process.249 The courts should generally 
defer to the FDA,250 which has broad discretion to establish and apply rules 
for public participation in Agency matters.251 This discretion gives the FDA 
broad authority to create and enforce its procedural rules on citizen 
petitions. The courts should also defer to the FDA when reviewing its 
factual determinations related to evaluating citizen petitions. 
1. Reduce Judicial Participation 
Courts may set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions if they 
are found to be “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or 
otherwise not in accordance with law.”252 In order to avoid such arbitrary 
and capricious rulings, the FDA should issue guidelines on the meaning 
of the terms “main purpose of delaying ANDA approval,” “intent to 
delay,” or “delaying petition,” as discussed previously in Part VI.A.4.253 
Absent clear guidelines, any FDA decision would likely need to define 
the meaning of “intent to delay” in order to avoid being found arbitrary 
or capricious. Such guidelines would streamline FDA decisions and 
create a baseline for the courts to review citizen petitions under the 
antitrust laws. 
Nonetheless, courts should not, in the interim, analyze such 
determinations to see whether they should be set aside. Agencies are 
granted broad deference because they are considered best equipped to 
 
 249. See Lee, supra note 48, at 126. 
 250. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984) (“We 
have long recognized that considerable weight should be accorded to an executive department’s 
construction of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to administer, and the principle of deference to 
administrative interpretations.”). 
 251. Bellotti v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 725 F.2d 1380, 1385 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (quoting Cities of 
Statesville v. Atomic Energy Comm’n, 441 F.2d 962, 963 (D.C. Cir. 1969)) (emphasizing that “an agency 
‘should be accorded broad discretion in establishing and applying rules for . . . public participation’”). 
 252. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012); see Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. 
Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 41 (1983). 
 253. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(q)(1)(E) (2011) (using language such as “primary purpose of delaying the 
approval” and denial based on “intent to delay”). 
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respond to “changing circumstances.”254 Recent cases suggest, however, 
that courts have come to ad hoc conclusions regarding the merits of 
eleventh-hour citizen petitions and that the sham exception is not 
consistently applied to Noerr-Pennington cases.255 
It is possible that the current legal climate for citizen petitions 
consists of those “changing circumstances.”256 The fact that the FDA 
issued a new rule suggests that the Agency has been taking notice of the 
hole it needs to plug.257 Both judges and academics have pointed out the 
failings of the legislation currently in place.258 If the FDA or the 
legislature pays greater attention to sham petitions and delineates the 
difference between what constitutes “sham” and “not sham,” it could 
speed up the process in which meritless petitions are deemed a sham. 
Allowing the FDA to determine whether a petition constitutes a sham 
would shift the responsibilities to the better-suited entity and increase 
the efficiency and certainty of labeling petitions as sham. Given the 
FDA’s greater expertise in evaluating scientific methodologies, judicial 
deference to FDA’s determination of whether a petition is a sham 
creates an effective system of deterrence.259 Alternatively, the FDA could 
promulgate clear guidelines regarding the definition of “sham,” and courts 
could rely on those guidelines in their analysis of alleged sham petitions. 
Another possible policy would be to create a rebuttable presumption 
in antitrust disputes that a petition is a sham if the FDA finds any of the 
claims to be late or suspicious. This rule could be especially relevant in 
claims that include fraudulent or misleading concerns.260 Such an approach 
would work in concert with the pre-screening processes proposed above in 
Part VI.A.i. 
 
 254.  Jeffrey E. Shuren, The Modern Regulatory Administrative State: A Response to Changing 
Circumstances, 38 Harv. J. on Legis. 291, 292 (2001) (“[O]ne of the primary reasons for granting 
agencies broad judicial deference in the implementation of statutory mandates is that agencies are the 
governmental entities best equipped to respond to changing circumstances.”). 
 255. See generally supra Part IV. 
 256. Consider that the Supreme Court has constantly expanded the scope of the sham exception to 
include new circumstances. Noerr-Pennington initially immunized from the antitrust laws only 
attempts to persuade the legislature and the executive branches. See E. R.R. Presidents Conference v. 
Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 136 (1961). The doctrine was later expanded to apply in the 
context of speech geared toward influencing administrative agencies and the courts. Cal. Motor 
Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510 (1972). The sham exception for litigation thus 
applies to all branches of government. And recently, the sham exception has been specifically applied 
to citizen petitions. See generally supra Part IV. 
 257. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(q)(1)(A)(ii) (2011); supra notes 74, 246 and accompanying text. 
 258. See, e.g., Carrier, supra note 64. 
 259. See Lee, supra note 48, at 126–27 (noting that the FDA has expertise in scientific 
methodologies). 
 260. See id. at 127 (noting that fraudulent or misleading claims are a concern). 
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2. Define the Court’s Role 
Courts can contribute by clarifying the second step of the 
Professional Real Estate test, which looks at the subjective intent of the 
filer. The Professional Real Estate standard has been the subject of 
scholarly debate,261 and critics argue that the second prong is redundant 
and should be eliminated.262 The argument is that the subjective prong 
arose out of early cases discussing the sham exception in a legislative 
setting and was then folded into the general test for the sham 
exception.263 It is arguably redundant because if a claim is objectively 
baseless, then the act of filing a lawsuit or citizen petition already 
demonstrates a lack of good faith and improper purpose.264 
Until the courts can manifest a clear standard, judicial guidance 
could lead to better regulation of sham petitions. Similar to the FDA’s 
rebuttable presumption proposed in Part VI.B.1, courts could develop a 
standard imposing strict liability on sham petitioners. For example, any 
citizen petition that fails to convince the FDA that it contains any 
scientifically valid arguments could be deemed a per se sham. This rule 
would remove the courts from making actual determinations as to the 
technical details contained in the petitions. Incentives like this will 
encourage petitioners to back up their submissions with valid scientific 
data, or not file them at all. 
The benefit of shifting the evaluation of the scientific merits of 
citizen petitions away from the courts and onto the FDA is clear. The 
Agency is acknowledged as the more adept entity in understanding 
scientific reasoning and making scientific determinations. While working 
with the FDA, courts must also aim to remain in a judicial setting where 
they may apply the wisdom of the legislative and administrative branches 
as they have done in the past. 
Conclusion 
The FDA’s citizen petition process is designed to allow anyone to 
raise concerns about any pending drug application.265 However, certain 
brand-name drug manufacturers have abused this process—using it 
instead for the sole purpose of delaying generic competition in violation 
 
 261. See Prof’l Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 508 U.S. 49, 69–70 
(1993) (Stevens, J., concurring) (explaining that “the Court has set up a straw man to justify its 
elaboration of a two-part test describing all potential shams”). 
 262. See Lee, supra note 48, at 128; Marina Lao, Reforming the Noerr-Pennington Antitrust 
Immunity Doctrine, 55 Rutgers L. Rev. 965, 1025–26 (2003) (“[T]his subjective test is unsuited for use 
in litigation settings. If a lawsuit is already shown to be objectively baseless, the institution of suit itself 
implicitly shows a degree of lack of good faith.”). 
 263. Lee, supra note 48, at 128 n.282. 
 264. Lao, supra note 262, at 1026. 
 265. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553(e) (2012). 
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of the antitrust laws. Such sham petitions typically ask the FDA to 
scrutinize a generic manufacturer’s ANDA while raising baseless legal or 
scientific objections. Even if rejected, the petitions often succeed in 
delaying ANDA approval for significant periods of time.266 
While the constitutional right to petition, in the guise of the Noerr-
Pennington doctrine, broadly immunizes petitions from antitrust liability, 
the “sham” exception provides a basis for challenging such 
anticompetitive behavior.267 Currently, petitions are found unlawful only 
if they are initiated for objectively baseless and subjectively 
anticompetitive reasons.268 However, the current standards for the sham 
exception are unworkable. The sham exception has been applied 
inconsistently, and it is difficult to predict if and when a mere petition 
crosses the line to become an antitrust violation. Brand-name 
manufacturers must be careful to ensure that their petitions include a 
sound scientific basis. In order to make the citizen petition process more 
effective and maintain the spirit of the Hatch-Waxman Act, the focus 
should shift from creating antitrust liability in courts to installing 
preventive measures at the FDA, such as reforming FDA regulations to 
deter meritless challenges, as well as increased guidance and scrutiny on 
the FDA’s part. Until these—or any—measures lead to a reform of the 
citizen petition process, practitioners must be well prepared to navigate 
the ups and downs of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine to their advantage. 
 
 
 266. See, e.g., Carrier, supra note 64. 
 267. E. R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 144 (1961); see Cal. 
Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510 (1972). 
 268. See Prof’l Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 508 U.S. 49, 60 (1993). 
